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I. INTRODUCTION
"Abandon Ship! Every man for himself"
Capt. Robert Salmond, HMS Birkenhead, 1852
"Stand fast! Women and children first!"
Lt.-Col. Alexander Seton, HMS Birkenhead, 1852
"But to stand an' be still to the Birken'ead Drill
is a damn tough bullet to chew"
Rudyard Kipling, Soldier an' Sailor Too'
I Accounts of the Birkenhead's wreck vary. See, e.g., lain Lundy, Women and Children
First, http:/Iheritage.scotsman.com/greatscots.cfm?id=592282005 (last visited Dec. 19, 2006);
Wikipedia, HMS Birkenhead, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilHMS-Birkenhead_(1845) (last
visited Dec. 19, 2006).
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Where is the legal theory that protects working teenagers from
sexual harassment? Where is their lifeboat? Who speaks for our
working adolescents and older teens on this subject?2 In 2006, the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
announced that "[d]uring the height of the summer of 2004, more
than 7.1 million young adults age 16-19 were employed."3  Did
those teens escape abuse?4 Consider that question while many
adults focus on their own welfare.
The sexual harassment of adult female workers remains a serious
problem; 5 however, increasing numbers of teenagers are filing
EEOC charges of discrimination. 6 In 2001, teenagers filed two
percent of the sexual harassment charges with the EEOC.7 By
2 A Westlaw search of all legal periodicals for the last five years-TI (child! or teen! or
adolescent!) & ((child! or teen! or adolescent!) w/5 (work or labor)) & ("FLSA" or 'Title VII") &
da(after 2000)-produced 176 articles. Only four law review articles, in addition to mine,
focused on child labor in the United States. Marie A. Failinger, "Too Cheap Work for Anybody
But Us" Toward a Theory and Practice of Good Child Labor, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1035 (2004);
Seymour Moskowitz, Malignant Indifference: The Wages of Contemporary Child Labor in the
United States, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 465 (2004); Celeste Corlett, Note, Impact of the 2000 Child
Labor Treaty on United States Child Laborers, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 713 (2002); Jessica
Krieg, Comment, There's No Business Like Show Business: Child Entertainers and the Law, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 429 (2004). Certainly, dedicated governmental agencies, including
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), function to protect working
teens. Most advocacy groups, however, focus on working children outside of the United
States. See, e.g., Understanding Children's Work (UCW), About the UCW Project,
http://www.ucw-project.org (stating that the UCW is an "inter-agency research project"
between the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF, and the World Bank) (last
visited Dec. 19, 2006); Church World Service (CWS), Caution: Children at Work,
http://www.churchworldservice.org/FactsHaveFaces/childwrk.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2006); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Child Protection from Violence,
Exploitation and Abuse, http://www.unicef.org/protectionlindexchildlabour.html (last visited
Dec. 19, 2006).
3 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FY 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET (2006),
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/2007budget/index.html [hereinafter EEOC 2007
PERFORMANCE BUDGET].
4 The answer is negative. See Moskowitz, supra note 2, at 494-501.
5 The EEOC reported that workers filed 12,679 charges of sexual harassment in 2005.
Men filed just over fourteen percent of those. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES: EEOC & FEPAs COMBINED: FY1992-FY2005,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
6 "The EEOC has seen, through charges filed and anecdotal evidence, that discrimination
is a problem for many in this [sixteen to nineteen-year-old] group." EEOC 2007
PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 3. The EEOC does not post the statistics for sexual
harassment charges by minors. In 2003, I requested the sexual harassment charge trends for
youths under eighteen and found that in 2002, minors filed approximately two percent (268 of
14,396) of the sexual harassment charges. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the Workplace:
"Consenting" Adolescents and a Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 479 & n.44 (2004)
[hereinafter Drobac, Sex and the Workplace]. Per the direction of the EEOC, I will file a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for additional and more current information.
7 Cathleen Flahardy, EEOC Responds to Harassment Complaints from Teens: Finish Line
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2004, that number had quadrupled to eight percent.8 Rates are
expected to rise.
Susan Fineran and James E. Gruber studied the problem of
adolescent sexual harassment with a small sample of 260 high
school females and found that forty-three percent had experienced
some form of sexual harassment at their part-time jobs.9 Youth
restaurant workers (62%) experienced more harassment than "care"
workers (29%) who engaged in tasks such as babysitting and
housekeeping.10 Teens described seventy-two percent of the
perpetrators as being older than they were. 1 This small study
sends an alarming message concerning the safety of adolescent
workers and confirms the need for more research in this area.
In 1979, long before today's working teenagers were even born,
Catharine A. MacKinnon described her subordination theory to
justify the prohibition of workplace sexual harassment as
discrimination based upon sex. 12 She wrote:
Women are sexually harassed by men because they are
women, that is, because of the social meaning of female
sexuality, here, in the employment context. Three kinds of
arguments support and illustrate this position: first, the
exchange of sex for survival has historically assured women's
economic dependence and inferiority as well as sexual
availability to men. Second, sexual harassment expresses
the male sex-role pattern of coercive sexual initiation toward
women .... Third, women's sexuality largely defines women
as women in this society, so violations of it are abuses of
women as women. 13
Other feminist legal theorists have added to our understanding of
Tailors Policy to Target Younger Workers, INSIDECOUNSEL, Nov. 2005, available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15_168/labor/218-1.html.
8 Id.
9 Susan Fineran & James E. Gruber, Sexual Harassment and Teens at Work 2 (Aug. 2005)
(transcript available with Susan Fineran, Associate Professor at the University of Southern
Maine). The authors noted that they studied predominantly white, suburban girls. Id. at 14.
They postulated that given harassment rates of other groups, their figures "underreported the
amount and type of [teen] harassment." Id. at 14, 19.
10 Id. at 11.
11 Id.
12 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 44 (1979). MacKinnon explained, "Sexual harassment, most broadly
defined, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of power derived from one
social sphere [employment, for example] to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another
[sexual relations]." Id. at 1.
13 Id. at 174.
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why workplace sexual harassment constitutes a civil rights
violation. 14  These views may protect some minors. However,
unique theoretical and ethical considerations may reinforce the
prohibitions against the sexual harassment of teen workers.
Any theoretical exploration of the treatment of working minors
must deal with several complicating factors. First, the law has
never treated adolescents the same as adults. 15 Statutory rape laws
provide one example of how the law treats adolescent sexual
conduct differently than it does consensual adult conduct.' 6 Based
upon the reasoning that those children under the age of consent do
not have the capacity to consent, statutory rape laws demonstrate
that the law invalidates adolescent "consent"1 7 under certain
circumstances.
Second, minors are not simply young adults. Teenagers exhibit
different psychosocial, physical, and neurological traits than do
most adults.'8  New research confirms that adolescent brain
development extends into the twenties, beyond the age of consent
set in every state.' 9  Impulse control, emotional regulation,
planning, decision-making, and organization capabilities may not
fully mature until the third decade of life.20 In addition, youth
14 See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1171-72 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111
HARV. L. REV. 445, 450-51 (1997); Martha Chamallas, Essay, Writing About Sexual
Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 37-39 (1993) (reviewing the
early scholarship); Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to
Professor Abrams, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1245, 1245, 1248-49 (1998); Katherine M. Franke,
What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 691 (1997) [Franke, Sexual
Harassment; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
15 See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 473-77 (reviewing how the law
treats adolescents differently than it does adults).
16 See id. at 484-86, 546 app. A; see also Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex
with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 706-07 (2000)
[hereinafter Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors]; Michelle Oberman, Turning
Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 22 (1994).
17 1 use quotations with adolescent "consent" because even explicit verbal consent by a
minor may not constitute legal consent. See, e.g., Combs v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.3d 574,
578 n.2 (Ky. 2006) ('Consent,' as used here, does not mean 'legal consent.' The law deems a
person under the age of sixteen to be incapable of consent. As used here, it means 'to
willingly engage in' the activity." (citation omitted)).
18 See Jennifer Ann Drobac, "Developing Capacity": Adolescent "Consent" at Work, at Law,
and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JuV. L. & POL'Y 1, 11-32 (2006) [hereinafter
Drobac, Developing Capacity] (discussing teen physical, psychosocial, and neurological
developmental research).
19 Compare id. at 17-18, with Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 546 app. A
(noting that the highest age of consent is eighteen).
20 Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 18, at 22-27; JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., AM. BAR
2007]
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experiences may influence the winnowing and reorganization of
brain gray matter during adolescence. 21  Thus, new scientific
research proves that adolescents are human being works in
progress.
These developmental differences may influence the way that
adolescents respond to and cope with sexual harassment. 22
According to former EEOC acting Chair Paul Igasaki:
[Y]oung people are taught to respect their elders, and despite
modern cautions that no one can touch you against your will,
it is always difficult to take the risk of coming forward. If
people experiencing harassment or unfair treatment are
underage, they may be reluctant to talk about the problem
with adults. When the problem touches on sex, teenagers
may not feel comfortable discussing the topic even with their
own parents.
23
ASS'N, ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL CULPABILITY 2 (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescence.pdf.
21 Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 18, at 17-19.
22 In a policy statement, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry
suggested: "It is common for children and adolescents to conceal these [sexual harassment]
offenses because they feel afraid, ashamed, vulnerable, and humiliated. They may actually
believe their own behavior may have precipitated the sexual harassment. These incidents are
often not revealed for many years, if ever." Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry,
Policy Statements: Sexual Harassment, Oct. 1992, http://www.aacap.org/page.ww?section=
Policy+Statements&name=Sexual+Harassment (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
23 Paul Igasaki, Civil Rights for Young Workers, IMDIVERSITY.cOM, Dec. 2004,
http://www.imdiversity.comNillages/Careers/articles/igasaki-youngworkers-1204.asp; see
also Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 18, at 39-40 (documenting youth reluctance to
discuss sexuality). According to Michael Blickman, who specializes in labor and employment
at the law firm Ice Miller in Indianapolis:
"Younger employees are definitely more vulnerable to sexual harassment," he said.
"Because they have less experience in the workplace, they tend not to know their rights."
And even if they do, they are less likely to complain because they fear retaliation or
the loss of the job, he said. Those attitudes often embolden the harasser.
Dana Knight, Sexual Harassment and Bias Complaints Surging Among the Young,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 14, 2005. Other experts hold similar views:
'"Teens are particularly vulnerable because they are new to the workplace, they are
impressionable and are more likely than not at the bottom rung," said Jocelyn Samuels,
vice president for education and employment with the National Women's Law Center.
' They feel less authorized to complain, and they may not know that procedures are
available to them."
"As long as humans have a dark spot, you can find a more sophisticated co-worker who
takes advantage of someone more naive," said Naomi C. Earp, vice chairwoman at the
EEOC, which launched a program this fall to train youths in high schools about sexual
harassment after noticing an increasing number of such complaints.
Some teens who are taunted or touched may think the actions are not serious or
assume that the culture is just part of work life, said Adele Rapport, regional attorney
for the EEOC in Detroit. Her office has seen a number of teen harassment cases.
"A very small percentage of women complain. That's part of the issue with teens,"
Rapport said. 'They are not sophisticated enough to know how to use those kinds of
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Thus, experience indicates that teens respond to sexual
harassment differently than adults do. We see that the second
distinguishing factor, developmental differences, relates to the first
complicating factor, differential legal treatment.24
Recognition of the unique nature and status of adolescence
clarifies a third complicating factor: adolescent "consent" may
signify something different than adult consent and may, therefore,
justify unique treatment under the law. Because adult consent (as
opposed to mere tolerance or acquiescence) provides a complete
defense to allegations of sexual harassment, 25 adolescent "consent"
must be carefully considered in the analysis of the theoretical and
ethical basis for sexual harassment prohibitions.
In Parts II and III, this Article considers the legal regulation of
sexual conduct and sex-based harassment. Part II explores how
socio-legal theory explains the regulation of sexuality. It discusses
how such theory might address unique characteristics of teen
development and employment to influence the law's treatment of
youth sexual harassment and adolescent "consent" to sex.
Traditional, liberal, feminist, and pansexual perspectives regarding
sexual conduct highlight the tension between safeguarding teen
sexual autonomy and protecting maturing adolescents. This tension
mirrors the conflict often associated with competing theoretical
approaches to child policy, the self-determinist approach and the
protectionist, nurturance perspectives. 26 Part III briefly reviews
sexual harassment legal theory and how it protects adolescent
workers. This section also notes the gaps in mainstream sexual
harassment legal theory through which adolescents may fall
resources to report it."
Amy Joyce, Lawsuits Shed New Light on Sexual Harassment of Teens; More Young Workers
File Complaints, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, at AO1.
24 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005) (using scientific and
sociological studies to justify its decision regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty
for minors); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834-35, 835 n.43 (1988) (distinguishing
legal rights of children and adults as related to adolescent psychosocial development).
25 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (explaining that voluntary
participation does not necessarily indicate consent or the welcomeness of the activity).
26 See, e.g., Melinda G. Schmidt & N. Dickon Reppucci, Children's Rights and Capacities,
in CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 76, 77 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2002)
("Whereas nurturance rights emphasize children's entitlements to nutrition, medical care,
and other benefits, self-determination rights allow children to make autonomous decisions
and exercise control over their environments."); see also LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST
INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 214 (1992) (exploring children's
liberationist views and arguing against equal rights for children); PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD 50-51 (1992) (describing the




Parts IV and V survey philosophical and psychological literature
regarding adolescent capacity, legal rights, and ethical conduct.
Part IV focuses first on classic philosophers who contemplated
juvenile capacity--or the lack thereof. It then discusses adolescent
psychosocial development to determine how science might influence
the law's redress of the sexual harassment of adolescents. In Part
V, this Article explores a Kantian perspective loosely patterned
after the "categorical imperative" to formulate a dignity-based
foundation for the prohibition of teen sexual harassment. This
section answers how the law might respond to teen "consent" and
explores the legal treatment of revocation.
Finally, Part VI concludes that the sexual harassment of
adolescents differs from that of adults. It summarizes how
harassment of teens is unique and offers a synthesis of legal theory,
ethics, and sexual harassment law. This section invites further
dialogue and assistance concerning the theoretical underpinnings
for the prohibition of sexual harassment of teenagers by their adult
co-workers.
II. SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND THE REGULATION OF SEX
The socio-legal regulation of sexual activity is not a new
phenomenon. Legal theory concerning the regulation of sexuality
may provide guidance for exploring the theoretical base of sexual
harassment prohibitions and the redress of teen sexual harassment.
A. The Traditional View
Some scholars, including Martha Chamallas and William
Eskridge, analyze the regulation of sex not according to the system
(i.e., civil or criminal), but according to historical, societal mores,
and values. In 1988, Chamallas distinguished between three
dominant attitudes concerning sexual conduct: the traditional view,
the liberal view, and the egalitarian view.27 She explained that the
traditional view relegated sexual conduct to the marriage bed. 28
This view, dominant until World War 11,29 promoted the marital
family as the primary social institution. Embodied in law, this view
27 Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 780 (1988).
28 Id. at 781.
29 Id. at 784.
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focused concern not upon the sexual activity but upon the status of
the parties. 30  The traditional view established normative
parameters around sex. This view rejected nonmarital sex and
female sexual autonomy. 31 Needless to say, it also rejected the
legitimacy of teen sexual exploration and autonomy. 32
Statutory rape law fits neatly within this traditional approach.
Criminalizing sex with unmarried young women works to
discourage both premarital sex and female autonomy. Professor
Lea VanderVelde discussed in her research on this subject how,
historically, a rapist might avoid prosecution by marrying his
victim. 33 In 1995, William Eskridge wrote that this was still the
case in Virginia. 34 Professor Chamallas noted that a promiscuous
female adolescent could not sue for statutory rape.35
The Bush administration's funding of abstinence-only education
and disapproval of premarital sex marks a renewed enthusiasm for
this traditional approach. 36 What is unclear, however, is how a neo-
traditional approach might influence sexual harassment law for
teenagers. One might anticipate no reform. Those teens who can
prove that they indicated the sexual harassment was unwelcome
can file under Title VII. Those who cannot prove their discomfort or
those who "consented" deserve no relief under a traditional
approach since those teens violated neo-traditional norms
concerning appropriate teen sexual conduct. The result is similar to
the denial of a rape claim by a promiscuous teenager.
Alternately, a neo-traditional reform might mandate the uniform
treatment of adolescent "consent" in civil and criminal laws. Since
the repeal of statutory rape laws would thwart neo-traditional
30 Id. at 781.
31 See Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 846 & n.140
(1996). Professor Chamallas has explained that the marital rape exemption insulated
husbands from rape prosecution or limited penalties, thereby negating the sexual freedom of
women. Chamallas, supra note 27, at 797-98, 797 n.95 ("Only ten states authorize
prosecutions of husbands for the rape of their wives on the same terms as other rape
defendants.").
32 See Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors, supra note 16, at 777 (advocating
for statutory rape laws to set normative parameters, enabling boys and girls to discover their
own sexual autonomy).
33 VanderVelde, supra note 31, at 846 & n.140.
34 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47,
56 & n.29 (1995) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-66 (1995)).
35 Chamallas, supra note 27, at 789 & n.56 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(3) cmt. at
419-20 (1980)).
36 Ceci Connolly, Some Abstinence Programs Mislead Teens, Report Says, WASH. POST, Dec.
2, 2004, at A01 (noting that the Bush administration planned to give $170 million in 2005 to
groups that teach abstinence-only).
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control of nonmarital sexual expression, jurists would have to
redraft civil law to match the dictates of criminal law regarding the
legal validity of "consent." Thus, we would end up with a variety of
interpretations of adolescent "consent" under Title VII, depending
on the respective state criminal designation of the age of consent.
Under that reform, one might also anticipate the denial of money
damages for those "consenting" underage plaintiffs since criminal
law provides no financial compensation to the victim.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently took a variation on
this approach in Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, a sexual harassment case
brought under Title VII by a sixteen-year-old teenager. 37 Judge
Richard Posner explained:
To avoid undermining valid state policy by reclassifying sex
that the state deems nonconsensual as consensual, to
simplify employment-discrimination litigation, and to avoid
intractable inquiries into maturity that legislatures
invariably pretermit by basing entitlements to public
benefits (right to vote, right to drive, right to drink, right to
own a gun, etc.) on specified ages rather than on a standard
of "maturity," federal courts, rather than deciding whether a
particular Title VII minor plaintiff was capable of
"welcoming" the sexual advances of an older man, should
defer to the judgment of average maturity in sexual matters
that is reflected in the age of consent in the state in which
the plaintiff is employed. That age of consent should thus be
the rule of decision in Title VII cases. 38
This passage confirms that litigants should look to the age of
consent set under state law to determine whether the plaintiffs
"consent" will have legal significance under Title VII. While the
underage plaintiffs "consent" presents no bar to liability, the court
suggested in dicta that evidence of her "consent" might "be used to
37 456 F.3d 704, 707 (7th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the facts, Judge Richard Posner noted:
Construing the evidence as favorably to her as the record permits, as we must, we
assume that Nayman, the shift supervisor, regularly hit on the girls (most of the
employees were teenage girls) and young women employed in the ice cream parlor. He
would, as one witness explained, "grope," "kiss," "grab butts," "hug," and give "tittie
twisters" to these employees, including the plaintiff. These things he did in the store,
but he would also invite the girls to his apartment. He had sexual intercourse in the
apartment with two of them, one of them a minor, before it was the plaintiffs turn. He
was 25 when he had intercourse with her.
Id. at 712-13.
38 Id. at 713.
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reduce the defendant's damages in such a case."39
Thus, while the court did not close the door completely to money
damages, it did invite a trial of the plaintiffs conduct on the matter.
Judge Posner added that "a jury should be able to sort out the
difference between an employer's causal contribution to the
statutory rape by its employee of a 16-year-old siren (if that turns
out to be an accurate description of Doe) and to similar conduct
toward, say, a 12-year-old."40 The court did not elaborate on what
evidence defense counsel might introduce to prove that an ice cream
scooper was a "siren."41 Nor is the opinion clear on why a sixteen
year old might be a "siren" while a twelve year old experiencing
similar conduct would not. One can anticipate, however, the
chilling effect that this ruling may have on "consenting" underage
teens and their parents who want to protect them from further
trauma.
For a variety of reasons, including the limitations on female
autonomy and the discriminatory distribution of marital benefits,
some adults and parents do not share an enthusiasm for neo-
traditionalism. They want their children to "know" their intended
life partners well, in every way, including the "biblical" one, before
they make an enduring commitment. This perspective does not
mean, however, that these parents disfavor laws that protect
adolescents from clever seducers and sexual pirates. These adults
might prefer legal reforms that acknowledge adolescent autonomy
and "developing capacity."42 In other words, they might prefer legal
reforms which focus on the alleged harasser's conduct and not on
adolescent "consent" that may bear no resemblance to adult
volitional affirmation.
39 Id. at 714.
40 Id. at 715.
41 See id.; OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 547-48 (2d ed. 1989) (defining siren as "[o]ne of
several fabulous monsters, part woman, part bird, who were supposed to lure sailors to
destruction by their enchanting singing").
42 Several years ago, I explained the term "developing capacity" and distinguished it from
"diminished capacity," a term used to describe juvenile criminal offenders:
I find the term "diminished capacity" inappropriate because the word "diminished"
carries a negative connotation. Additionally, it suggests that full capacity should exist or
may once have existed. Most teenagers suffer not from impairment but from
immaturity-a blameless condition and a natural phase of growth. I prefer the term
"developing capacity" because of a teenager's transitional status from childhood to
adulthood and his or her developing maturity.
Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 518-19 (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Liberal View
Associated with the sexual revolution that reached its height
during the 1960s, the liberal view emphasized consent, not
marriage. 43 During the reign of sexual liberalism, the Supreme
Court recognized the penumbral right to privacy, protecting citizens
from governmental interference in matters pertaining to sexuality
and procreation. 44 Only external harm to a third person justified
legal intervention under this view. 45 Chamallas noted that because
choice and consent legitimized much of what had been legally
disapproved (nonmarital sex), the definition of consent became
critically important.46 She explained:
Consent is a devilishly malleable term which may describe a
wide spectrum of responsive behavior, ranging from the mere
failure to engage in active resistance, to active participation
in and encouragement of another's initiatives. For that
reason, a decision as to what conduct constitutes consent in
any particular context may mask value judgments implicit in
the choice of definition. A determination of sexual consent
may, for example, serve as a proxy for moral judgments
about the behavior of the parties or as a shorthand method
for classifying certain forms of sexual behavior as normal.
47
Chamallas' discussion of consent prompts the idea that the
criminal system's continuing denial of adolescent capacity reflects a
value judgment that we, through our prosecutors, want to control
adolescent sexual conduct. We think that sex with a minor is
abnormal. 48 Rather than punish the young for violating our chosen
parameters, we call them incompetent and punish, or attempt to
43 Chamallas, supra note 27, at 790, 793.
44 Id. at 793. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("That the
constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to an individual's liberty to make choices
regarding contraception .. "); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman's
right to privacy, either grounded in the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendments, "is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the right to use contraception "concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees").
45 Chamallas, supra note 27, at 782.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 795 (footnotes omitted).
48 The notion of abnormality includes the view that teen-adult sex may be damaging to the
minor. It also includes the view that even if the sex is not physically or psychologically
damaging, teen-adult sex is morally wrong, consistent with the traditional view. While we
may not hold the teen responsible for her participatory conduct in the first case, we might in
the second. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 714 (7th Cir. 2006).
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deter, those who would thwart our notion of what is acceptable
sexual conduct for a minor.
Civil (legal) recognition of adolescent "consent," where it exists,
may indicate a liberal value judgment about adolescent sexuality. 49
Perhaps evolving societal liberalism influenced the civil system
more quickly than it did the criminal system and, therefore,
explains the civil system's treatment of adolescent sexuality. On
the other hand, we still maintain control over adolescent conduct in
the civil system by withholding access, thereby preventing
adolescents, without representation by parents or guardians, from
suing.50
At the same time, some civil courts deem restoration for sexual
(mis)conduct against minors in the form of money damages
abnormal, offensive, or at least suspect. 51 Paul Igasaki noted:
In cases of this sort [i.e., youth sexual harassment claims],
the monetary damage awards can be misleading or seem
confusing to older people. After all, even in a legitimate
claim, one might ask how much is really "lost" by a young
person possibly working for a brief stint at a low-paying gig,
with other opportunities and career options ahead of them.
Viewed in this limited light, the loss of a presumably
temporary, burger-flipping job may seem "no big deal" or not
worthy of significant damages. Some may even suspect that
complaints are a "scam" to win big awards.5 2
Do adults simply discount the value of a job at a burger joint (or
49 See, e.g., Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 527-32 (discussing cases in
which the court gives adolescent consent legal weight).
50 Many states prohibit minors from filing lawsuits unless represented by a parent, next
friend, or guardian. See, e.g., Porter v. Triad of Arizona, 52 P.3d 799, 802 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a minor may not bring an action in his own name but may sue through a
representative); Am. Alternative Energy Partners II v. Windridge, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686,
690-91 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the incapacity of minors bars them from representing
their own interests in court); Newman v. Newman, 663 A.2d 980, 987 (Conn. 1995) (holding
that a child may bring an action only through a next friend or guardian); Klak v. Skellion, 741
N.E.2d 288, 289-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that a minor has no capacity to maintain an
action in his name); Cleaver v. George Staton Co., 908 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding a lack of capacity because of the disability of minors pertaining to the right to sue in
one's own name); Jensen ex rel. Stierman v. McPherson, 655 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (relying on section 803.01(3)(c)(2) of the Wisconsin Statues that requires an adult to
represent the minor).
51 See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 530-31 (discussing LK v. Reed, 631
So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1994)). LK v. Reed involved a thirteen-year-old special education
student. 631 So. 2d at 605. The Reed trial court suggested that girls might deliberately
initiate sexual liaisons, "provoke" criminal prosecution, and recover damages. Id. at 607; see
also Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 531.
52 Igasaki, supra note 23.
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ice cream parlor)? Or do they also distrust sexually active youth?53
In Oberweis, Judge Posner referred to Doe as possibly a "siren" and
"a part-time teenage worker-[who] would hardly have been
considered a valued employee."5 4 Thus, adults do both.
In Doe ex rel. Roe v. Orangeburg County School District,55 the
South Carolina Supreme Court also ruled that a fourteen year old's
''consent" to sexual battery was admissible as to the issue of
damages but not as to liability.56 The Court explained:
Unlike the victim in a criminal case, the plaintiff in a civil
damage action is "on trial" in the sense that he or she is an
actual party seeking affirmative relief from another party.
Such plaintiff is a voluntary participant, with strong
financial incentive to shape the evidence that determines the
outcome. 57
One could argue that the court simply distrusted plaintiffs, but
such an argument would not explain the admissibility of "consent"
as to liability. The additional irony here is that South Carolina Doe
was not even the plaintiff.58 Her guardian was.5 9
The interpretation of "consent," treated differently depending
upon the context, may serve as a proxy for traditional moral
judgments about adolescent sexuality. In Oberweis, Judge Posner
commented:
At the damages stage of this proceeding, should it get that
far, the defendant-who is not Nayman, but Nayman's
employer-should be permitted to put Nayman's conduct in
perspective. If Doe was sneaking around behind her
mother's-and her employer's-back and thus facilitating
Nayman's behavior, the employer may be able to show that
the harm she suffered that was caused by its violation of
Title VII (if such a violation is found on remand), rather than
53 See, e.g., Suzanne M. Sgroi, Discovery, Reporting, Investigation, and Prosecution of Child
Sexual Abuse, 29 SIECUS REP., Oct./Nov. 2000, at 6. Dr. Sgroi explained:
There was also a widespread belief (then [during the 1970s] as now) that engaging in
sexual interaction was a transforming experience that marked an individual's rite of
passage to adulthood. A sexually experienced child was viewed as an anomaly by most of
the general public, who believed that youthful victims of sexual abuse had 'lost their
innocence" and become contaminated in a way that made them seductive and dangerous.
Id.
54 456 F.3d 704, 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2006).
55 518 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1999).
56 Id. at 261.
57 Id. (quoting Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337, 1342 (Ind. 1992)).
58 Id. at 259.
59 Id.
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by Nayman, was minimal.60
One might argue that a reading of the Illinois statutory rape law
would put Nayman's conduct into perspective for any jury. The
court, however, focuses on the possibility that Doe was sneaking
around to facilitate Nayman's behavior-as if this supervisor, 61 the
employer's agent, was incapable of resisting her sirenian charm.62
Clearly, the court sees her potentially as guilty as her supervisor, a
man nine years her senior.63
Certainly, if Doe was "sneaking around" and deceiving her
parents, she should not have been. We need, however, to look
deeper. Why was she sneaking? Was she thinking clearly,
anticipating the consequences of her actions? Had her neurological
synapses formed sufficiently that she was even capable of
anticipating the consequences? Is her conduct as culpable as
Nayman's such that she deserves to be placed on trial for being a
"siren"? And is "siren" just a more genteel substitute for "slut"? Are
we concerned because she deceived her mother, because she defied
adult authority and dominion to meet the man who professed to
care for her? Is it possible that she was not defying adult authority
but merely complying with Nayman's? Perspective is so important.
Spin is everything. In Romeo and Juliet, William Shakespeare
cautioned, "Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied,/And vice
sometime's by action dignified."64
As we craft legal defaults, we need to consider carefully. Is it
likely that nine girls out of ten will prove "Lolita"65 such that we
need to protect unwary men and uninformed employers? Or is it
more likely that nine out of ten girls will prove confused, misguided,
foolishly duped-such that we should protect them and put the
adults on notice? And what about the tenth girl, the siren? How do
we deal with her? Rather than punish nine girls out of ten to catch
her, perhaps we could admonish the supervisor to keep it zipped
and the employer to select its agents more carefully. The law is a
blunt knife; arguably, one that should not be turned against
60 456 F.3d 704, 715 (7th Cir. 2006).
61 The question arose in Oberweis whether Nayman was, in fact, a supervisor. The court
concluded in dicta that he was. Id. at 717.
62 Id. at 715.
63 Id. at 713.
6 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 3.
65 Ironically, in the novel, Lolita was not the narrating protagonist but was the object of a
pedophile's desire. See generally VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA (Vintage Books 1989) (1955)




Whether the civil system's treatment of adolescent sexuality
reflects a traditional or liberal perspective, the results are the same
and appear quite sad. An underage adolescent suffers the shame,
humiliation, and trauma of a public trial, while she endures the
prosecution of her abuser.6 6 She may be constrained or completely
pre-empted, however, in her suit for damages and emotional
distress because of her "consent." A look at this ironic result raises
two questions. First, why do we anticipate her shame and trauma
in the criminal context? Would she suffer shame because someone
stole her car or ran into her with one? Arguably, we expect shame
because of the lingering notion that the female attracts her rapist
and the abuse she suffers. Traditional notions about pre-marital
sex, the shame of unwed pregnancy, abortion, and welfare
dependency contribute to the disapproval and, therefore, the
shame.67 If this is true, then we answer a second question: Why do
we deny civil damages to a sexually active minor? Because she is
morally tainted and undeserving.
Another ironic fact results from this inconsistent treatment of
"consent": the convicted faces incarceration and perpetual social
stigma as a registered sex offender in the criminal arena. At the
same time, he enjoys potential immunity from prosecution for
monetary damages for any emotional and physical injuries he
caused the minor. 68  How is this logical? Again, an explanation
finds its roots in the idea that we find him less culpable if she failed
to say "No," or if, heaven forbid, she said, 'Yes." We may have
experienced the sexual revolution but as with any "revolution," one
often returns to the starting point. Query whether society ever
really abandoned the association between moral taint and the
sexually active teen female.
66 In Oberweis, Doe's alleged harasser, Matt Nayman, was tried, convicted, and imprisoned
under Illinois criminal law for his sexual conduct with Doe. 456 F.3d at 707.
67 See, e.g., JENNIFER J. FROST ET AL., THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., TEENAGE SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, OCCASIONAL REPORT No. 8, at 16 (2001),
available at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/us-teens.pdf (explaining that disapproval motivates
concern over teenage pregnancy).
68 See Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no individual
liability under Title VII).
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C. The Egalitarian and Mutuality Perspectives
Professor Chamallas offered the egalitarian view as the feminist
critical response to liberalism and the slippery definition of consent.
The egalitarian perspective, a creation of the feminist movement of
the 1970s, unveiled the fallacy of "consent" by females subordinated
and disempowered in a male dominated culture. 69 This view asked
whether women could truly consent in the face of threatened
violence, economic coercion, and duplicitous misrepresentation. 70
The negative answer prompted the reform of criminal rape laws, 71
the advent of sexual harassment cases, 72 and the first sexual
deception tort actions.7 3
Thus, for Chamallas and feminist egalitarians, three inducements
to consent-physical force, economic pressure, and deception-
invalidate any "consent" procured by the more powerful, wealthier,
or better-informed male partner. 74 For Chamallas, equality and
mutuality, not just consent, are the keys to legitimate sexual
activity.7 5  Chamallas acknowledged that her analysis of these
inducements first found expression in contract law.7 6 The law
voided contracts compelled by force and made voidable those
contracts induced by economic duress or misrepresentations.7 7 She
noted that the inducements "are novel, however, in their application
to the sexual encounter, a relationship the law seldom treats as
contractual."78
William Eskridge also wrote of modern law's "movement from
69 Chamallas, supra note 27, at 796.
70 See id. at 796-97.
71 Id. at 797-800. Chamallas highlighted the elimination of the resistance requirement
and the passage of rape shield laws as two significant feminist reforms of criminal rape law.
Id. at 799 & n.101.
72 Id. at 801-10, 801 n.109 ("Catharine MacKinnon states that the term was apparently
first used as a term of art by activist groups in 1975."). For further information regarding
this topic, see MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 27.
73 Chamallas, supra note 27, at 810-11. Chamallas discussed injury claims for sexually
transmitted diseases and pregnancy complications. Id. at 811. In these cases, the defendants
misled the plaintiff by lying or by failing to disclose critical information. Id. In all of these
cases, the plaintiff experienced physical harm associated with the lie or omission. Id.
Chamallas distinguished the sexual deception actions from the old seduction and breach of
promise to marry claims. Id. at 813. The deception claims seek recovery for physical
damages, not for damage to reputation. Id. at 811. Query whether a court would allow a
claim for psychological injuries brought through a sexual deception claim.
74 Id. at 814.
75 Id. at 815.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 815 n. 167 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.15-. 17 (1982)).
78 Id. at 815.
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status to contract, from a medieval, collectivist understanding of
human relations to a liberal, individual rights one."79  Like
Chamallas, Eskridge saw consent to sexual contact invalidated by
several factors.80 In addition to physical force, economic duress, and
deception, Eskridge suggested that the form of the activity and the
status of the parties continue to play important roles.81  For
example, Eskridge emphasized that sodomy and sadomasochism
(S&M) were (at the time he wrote) illegal in many jurisdictions
despite the consent of the parties.8 2 He explained the continuing
importance of status:
Liberal consent-based regimes of legal regulation do not
spring full-grown from the brow of Zeus. They accrete over
time, gradually displacing traditional status-based
regimes.... [W]e do not enjoy a liberal regime for regulating
sexuality, and.., the regime we do have reflects a mixture of
consent-based and status-based rules. The ubiquitous
language of consent is just a rhetorical device for discussing
the issue, but a device masking the more complex reality.
8 3
Eskridge discussed not only marital status but also familial
status and incest.8 4 He identified pedophilia, bestiality, and mental
disability as conditions or behaviors that negated consent.8 5 For
this last trio of factors, Eskridge concluded that incapacity (of the
child, animal, or disabled) ostensibly justified the negation of
"consent."8 6 Eskridge challenged the inclusion of adolescents in this
last trio with the contention that fourteen and fifteen year olds
engage in sexual behavior.8 7 He pondered whether they might
79 Eskridge, supra note 34, at 48.
80 Id. at 49-51.
s See id.
82 Id. at 50 & n.16 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (1995)). In 2003, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas criminal law that prohibited consensual, adult,
homosexual sodomy. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). Thus, the Court
removed one barrier to which Eskridge referred. The Court specifically noted, however, that
its opinion addressed only adult conduct. Id. at 564, 578. It cautioned, 'The present case
does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused." Id. at 578.
83 Eskridge, supra note 34, at 53. Some scholars may challenge Eskridge's linear
description of a movement from the legal preference of status to contract. For example, Dan
Cole suggests, referring to landlord-tenant rights, that the emphasis ebbs and flows.
Comments from Professor Dan Cole (on file with author). Cole acknowledges, though, that
Eskridge's point survives this ebb and flow. Id.
84 Eskridge, supra note 34, at 49-51, 54-55.
85 Id. at 51.
86 Id. at 52.
87 Id. Eskridge gave no citation for his reference to national surveys concerning the sexual
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actually have the capacity to make that choice.88
Accepting Eskridge's mixed-regime perspective, one might argue
that criminal statutory rape laws rely on the old status-based
regime where the adolescent's "consent" matters only to classify the
level of the crime. Civil laws reflect the more modern liberal view
and highlight the transition from a status-based regime to a
consent-based one. Finally, sexual harassment law results from the
egalitarian, feminist response to the liberal view. It addresses the
economic coercion or the power differential between the perpetrator
and the "consenting" female employee. Perhaps Oberweis
showcases the gradual transition to a more liberal regime, if not a
completely feminist one.
Mutuality also attracted Eskridge's attention but he approached
it from a slightly different angle than did Chamallas. He relied
upon gay experience and gay theory to explore the regulation of
sexuality.8 9 Agreeing with feminist theorists, Eskridge rejected
marriage as the legitimizing force for sexuality.90 However, he went
beyond some feminists to embrace the diversity of sexuality
represented in S&M and Bondage and Domination (B&D).91
Eskridge explained that "[t]he B&D literature suggests both
procedural and substantive methods by which to achieve the
feminist goal of mutual benefit from sex in a society of diverse
sexual preferences." 92
Eskridge also addressed sex with minors. He noted:
What has been missing in the American hysteria about sex
with children has been fact-based theorizing about children's
sexual development and the effects of sex with older people
on that development....
On the other hand, the gay experience suggests reasons to
be cautious. One of them is AIDS. The HIV virus has
infected the adolescent population through adolescent sex
with older infected people who take advantage of adolescent
immaturity to induce unsafe practices. Moreover, it may
well be fair to do what Virginia has done, and to err on the
side of caution in regulating sex between adolescents and
behavior of fourteen and fifteen year olds.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 62-63.
90 Id. ("From our point of view, marriage is a rotten organizing principle, first, because
same-sex couples are excluded from marriage.").
91 Id. at 63.
92 Id. at 64.
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adults, while leaving sex araong adolescents essentially
unregulated.93
Eskridge's discussion of adolescent sexuality displays a
frustration with the lack of fact-based knowledge about adolescent
development as well as an acknowledgement of teen vulnerability
caused by immaturity.94 Teen ignorance and inexperience may also
contribute to their vulnerability.
In sum, scholars such as Chamallas and Eskridge view the
treatment of consent to sex as a part of a regulatory regime. 95 When
procreative marriage is the goal, consent to nonmarital sex
validates little. When individual power and autonomy are the
valued conditions, consent validates much sexual conduct but also
leads to asymmetrical relations and, thereby, taints consent. When
society emphasizes equality and mutuality, the quality of the
consent and the capacity of the one consenting receive greater
scrutiny. The negative inducements-physical force, economic
duress, and deception-invalidate apparent "consent."
D. A Pansexual Perspective
A pansexual perspective provides yet another useful view of
consent as part of a regulatory scheme. Several years ago, I
introduced the idea of pansexuality as a tool that "deconstructs the
stereotypical interrelation [of] biological sex and sexual behavior. ' 96
Pansexuality encompasses the sexuality of children. When we think
of sexuality, most people automatically think of adult activity. This
automatic response reflects stereotyped thinking, the notion that
only adults can (or should) engage in sexual conduct. A pansexual
93 Id. at 65 (footnotes omitted).
94 See id. at 65.
95 See Chamallas, supra note 27, at 795; Eskridge, supra note 34, at 55. Eskridge
elaborated upon his thesis by asking what motivated the policy-based construction of the law
concerning sexual consent. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 57-58. He concluded that "Victorian
male fantasies" explain its initial construction. Id. at 58.
96 Jennifer Ann Drobac, Pansexuality and the Law, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 297, 298
(1999). I suggested:
Pansexuality encompasses all kinds of sexuality. It differs, however, from
pansexualism, a perspective that declares "all desire and interest are derived from the
sex instinct." Pansexuality includes heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and
sexual behavior that does not necessarily involve a coupling. It includes, for example,
masturbation, celibacy, fetishism, and fantasy. Moreover, pansexuality includes
heteroerotic and homoerotic play and sexual aggression, sometimes mislabeled as
"horseplay."
I submit we are all pansexual, individually, and as a collective.
Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
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perspective is one that attempts to unveil stereotypical
interconnections that hinder us in exploring biological sex, gender,
and sexuality.97 This perspective also facilitates the deconstruction
of the stereotypical interrelation of age and sexual behavior.
Experts agree that children are born sexual beings.98 As they
mature, their sexuality develops. 99  A pansexual perspective
acknowledges that development and its nuanced expression. The
statistics regarding teen sexuality reinforce the validity of a
pansexual perspective.100
Because the pansexual perspective eschews stereotypical
interconnections and emphasizes the panorama of human potential,
it encourages an approach to adolescent sexuality that steps beyond
bright line demarcations. For example, one might argue that if
teens are finding adult sexual partners at work, society should
toughen the statutory rape and other child molestation laws. Such
an approach denies "developing capacity" and, more particularly,
teen sexual development. A pansexual approach acknowledges both.
the need for teen sexual experimentation and a measure of
protection to neutralize youth sexual predators and minimize the
negative consequences of immature choices. A pansexual
perspective in combination with notions of mutuality and equality
holds promise for the legal regulation of adolescent sexuality and
teen-adult sexual relations.
E. Socio-Legal Theory for the Twenty-First Century Adolescent
New developments in the socio-legal regulatory regime that stress
equality and mutuality must address the unique position of
adolescents. Never in the history of the United States have
97 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual Response, 30 McGEORGE
L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1999).
98 LYNN BLINN PIKE, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, SEXUALITY & YOUR CHILD: FOR
AGES 0 TO 3, at 1 (2000), available at http://muextension.missouri.edu/explorepdf/
hesguide/humanrelIGH600l.pdf ("Sexual learning, however, begins at birth. It is during the
early years that your child will develop basic attitudes about sexuality."). See generally MEG
HICKLING, SPEAKING OF SEX: ARE YOU READY TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS YOUR KIDS WILL
ASK? (1996) (discussing how to approach conversations about sex with children of all ages).
99 See ANGELA HUEBNER, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INST., ADOLESCENT GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.ext.vt.edu/pubs/family/350-850/350-
850.pdf; LYNN BLINN PIKE, UNIVERISITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, SEXUALITY AND YOUR
CHILD: FOR AGES 3 TO 7, at 1 (1995), available at http://muextension.missouri.edu/explorepdf/
hesguide/humanrel/GH6002.pdf.
,00 See Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 18, 32-39 (discussing adolescent sexuality,
consent, and sexual harassment).
2007]
Albany Law Review
adolescents enjoyed a fully equal status with adults. The notion of
adolescent-adult equality and mutuality contradicts historical and
current social conditions, as well as legal reality. If we value
equality and mutuality, then we should never assume, as we do
with the "rule of sevens,"10 1 that an adolescent has the capacity to
consent to sex with an adult. Whether or not she has capacity, she
may lack the fortitude and power to refuse an adult solicitation of a
sexual relationship. Her lack of equality alone makes any "consent"
potentially suspect and dictates against a presumption of capacity.
We also must acknowledge that all three of the negative
inducements may be important in the context of teen-adult sex.
1. Physical Force
First, physical force certainly plays a role. Anecdotal evidence
from teen sexual harassment charges confirms that supervisors use
physical force to intimidate and harass teen workers. At one Burger
King in Missouri, a male manager pinned young female workers
against the wall in a walk-in freezer and grabbed their breasts.10 2 A
male manager at a California UltraStar Cinema assaulted a
sixteen-year-old female worker, dislocating her shoulder.10 3 A male
manager at a Pennsylvania Mexican restaurant sexually assaulted
a sixteen-year-old female worker. 10 4 Promising a ride home to a
fourteen-year-old Kansas fast food worker, a manager drove her to
his house and sexually assaulted her.105 Another question for
scientific investigation is whether youth workers disproportionately
face more violence and aggression because of their physical and
emotional immaturity and relative lack of power.
101 Under this rule, a minor under age seven cannot give consent, be held liable for
negligent conduct, or formulate the requisite mental state to engage in criminal conduct.
From seven to fourteen, the law presumes that a minor lacks capacity. From fourteen to
eighteen, a rebuttable presumption declares that minors are competent to consent and are
responsible for criminal and negligent conduct. In the criminal system, this rule is also
known as the infancy defense. See generally MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE
LAW 180-81 (1997) (discussing the infancy defense and capacity to commit a crime).
102 Kim Bell, Teens Told to Speak Out Against Harassment, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
June 26, 2006, at B1.
103 Flahardy, supra note 7.
104 Youth @ Work, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Sixteen-year-old Claims
She Was Sexually Harassed at Pennsylvania Mexican Restaurant, http://youth.eeoc.gov/
case2.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
105 Youth @ Work, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Fourteen-year-old
Reports Sexual Harassment and Assault at Kansas Fast Food Restaurant,
http://youth.eeoc.gov/case3.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
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2. Duress and Teen Responses
Second, economic duress must figure prominently in the choice of
adolescents to "consent" to sexual relations with workplace
supervisors and managers. With adolescent unemployment so
high, 10 6 and teen job skills so low, the level of duress arguably
increases when a supervisor presses sexual activity. One young
female worker from a Missouri Burger King allegedly had sex with
the manager after he threatened her job.10 7
How much of such sexual duress goes unreported because of teen
reluctance to talk about sexual issues that Paul Igasaki noted?108 In
the Missouri case an investigative reporter explained:
Family members of the girls helped crack the case.
One of the teens became withdrawn and moody at home
but wouldn't confide. Her older sister figured something at
work was the culprit. So the older sister went undercover-
getting hired at the same restaurant-to find the truth. On
the older sister's second day on the job, the boss began doing
the same things to her. He would rub up against her while
she was at a cash register and make sexual comments.
The mother of another victim took a tape recorder into the
Burger King to gather evidence. She asked people what they
had seen. Her daughter had been too afraid to come forward,
fearing she would lose her job as part of a school Work Study
program and be unable to graduate.10 9
This anecdote confirms not only Igasaki's experience regarding
teen response to sexual harassment but also highlights a
manipulation tool unique to student workers who work for
scholastic credit. While harassers coerce adult workers with the
loss of tangible economic benefits, predators can often coerce
student workers with the loss of both economic and academic
benefits. 110
106 See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 477-78 (noting that youth
unemployment rates far exceed those for adults and range from between fifteen and thirty-
five percent).
107 Bell, supra note 102.
108 See Igasaki, supra note 23; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
109 Bell, supra note 102.
110 See generally JENNIFER ANN DROBAC, SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: HISTORY, CASES, AND
THEORY 511-28 (2005) (reviewing the harassment of student interns).
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3. Deception and Teen Perception
Third, deception may also play an increased role in securing
workplace adolescent consent or sexual favors. Inexperience and
naivet6 lead some adolescents to accept as true the most seemingly
obvious misrepresentations. Adele Rapport, an EEOC attorney in
Detroit, suggested that teens may conclude that taunting and
touching are not serious or are just part of work culture.111 I
prosecuted a sexual harassment case against a movie theater in
which a fifteen year old initially rebuffed her forty-year-old
manager's sexual advances.'1 2 Later, she believed him when he lied
to her, saying that he had a brain tumor and would live only a few
months.11 3  He said that he loved her and that they should
consummate "their love" while he could. When she was sixteen, she
finally "consented" and was soon pregnant. 1 4 This case provides
just one example of youthful gullibility and predatory deception.
This story rivals only those of the daytime soap operas. The
influence of coyote confidants highlights adolescent vulnerability.
Finally, adolescents may view their adult supervisors and co-
workers as parental authority figures or as role models for whom
compliance and obedience is expected. 1 5  An American Bar
Association primer on child sexual abuse states, "[i]n other cases,
[sexual abuse] offenders achieve compliance through the abuse of
adult authority."116  Recall Igasaki's comment that children are
taught to respect their elders.11 7 In one school sexual harassment
case, the court noted, "[a] teenaged student's susceptibility to
coercion by an adult role model inherently contains the elements of
'quid pro quo' activity which, under the current Title VII standards,
M'l Joyce, supra note 23.
112 Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, at 471-72 (describing [Doe] v. Culver
Theaters, No. CV139513 (Cal. Santa Cruz Super. Ct. 1999)).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 The Vice-President for Education and Employment at the National Women's Law
Center, Jocelyn Samuels, offered, '[teens] feel less authorized to complain, and they may not
know that procedures are available to them."' Joyce, supra note 23.
116 CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE 3 (Josephine Bulkley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994). Many states recognize an
enhancement of sexual assault offenses against a minor when a member of the family or other
adult in a position of authority commits the offense. Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra
note 6, at 546 app. A; see also Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law:
In Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 66-69 (1997).
117 See Igasaki, supra note 23.
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invokes strict liability."118 Adult female workers might feel obliged
to respect managerial authority but, unlike teen workers, they do
not suffer the added servility of youth.
4. Socio-Legal Theory and Sexual Harassment Law
This discussion of general socio-legal theory relating to sexual
relations offers guidance on the issue of teen sexual harassment and
"consent." A pansexual perspective acknowledges that teens are
sexual beings that need opportunities to develop sexually in age-
appropriate, safe ways. This view is consistent with an emphasis on
equality and mutuality. Such an approach rules out most teen-
adult sexual relationships at work since that environment may
compromise both equality and mutuality for teens.
As an acknowledgement to teen "developing capacity" and
autonomy, I have elsewhere advocated against legally restricting a
teen who chooses to engage in sex with an adult co-worker.11 9 The
adult partner would still run the risk of criminal prosecution and
civil liability if the teen later withdrew consent during her minority
(or shortly thereafter),120 upon determining that her adult partner
took advantage of her "developing capacity" or other vulnerability at
the workplace. A strict liability scheme would prevent her
withdrawn consent from being used against her in any subsequent
sexual harassment suit.121 This approach operates like adolescent
"consent" to a contract under common law.1 22 The "consent" to sex is
118 Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 n.3 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also State v.
Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 752 (Utah 2006). The court in Holm found:
While the State's power to interfere with the private relationships of consenting adults is
limited, it is well established that the same is not true where one of the individuals
involved in the relationship is a minor. See State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 732 (Utah
1984) (accepting the proposition "that young people should be protected from sexual
exploitation by older, more experienced persons until they reach the legal age of consent
and can more maturely comprehend and appreciate the consequences of their sexual
acts").
Id.
119 See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 6, 544-45.
120 I advocated an appropriate limitations period for suit and recovery. Id. at 545 n.377.
121 1 advised making evidence of consent admissible in any second (or successive) trial for
money damages if the minor had successfully sued for similar injuries on a prior occasion. Id.
at 544 n.375. Such a rule should satisfy skeptics. Moreover, we can expect previously injured
minors to learn from the past and not need the same level of protection funded by an
employer. Id.
122 Common law declared that a contract with a minor was not void but was voidable by
the minor. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 227, at 318 (1st vol. ed. 1952).
This law remains the majority rule. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD,
FAMILY, AND STATE 1081 (4th ed. 2000).
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voidable by the minor but not void. Adults remain free to "just say
no." As we move through the discussion regarding the theoretical
support for the prohibition of sexual harassment, we should keep
this approach in mind for further analysis.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LEGAL THEORY
While socio-legal theory offers guidance for the theoretical
justification of sexual harassment prohibitions, feminist legal
theorists have created a library of work that addresses the problem
directly. Because federal law did not explicitly prohibit the sexual
harassment of women, feminist legal theorists first worked to prove
why sexual harassment constituted discrimination "because of...
sex" under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 123 As noted,
Catherine MacKinnon introduced her subordination theory in 1979.
She suggested that the male demand for sexual favors from female
workers reinforces their subordination to men. She explained:
Sexual harassment perpetuates the interlocked structure
by which women have been kept sexually in thrall to men
and at the bottom of the labor market. Two forces of
American society converge: men's control over women's
sexuality and capital's control over employees' work lives....
A guarantee of equal access to job training, education,
and skills has little substance if a requirement of equality in
hiring, promotion, and pay can legally be withheld if a
woman refuses to grant sexual favors. 124
Certainly this reasoning applies to female teens as well as to
adult women. However, it does not translate, without explanation,
to support prohibitions for harassed teen males.
A. Beyond the Subordination of Women
The subordination theory depends on the exploitation of sexuality
as associated with biological sex to sustain power roles, particularly
heterosexual male power. 125 MacKinnon reasoned that "[f]rom an
inequality perspective, too, the vulnerability of gays is analogous to
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); see MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 5-6.
124 MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 174, 177.
125 See id. at 220-21.
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that of women."126 One might similarly argue that the vulnerability
of minors is analogous to that of women. Males traditionally
exercised phenomenal power over children. Early Roman law
permitted even infanticide by fathers. 127 Thus, one could argue that
male domination finds expression in the sexual subordination of
younger, less powerful males and females.
Prisons provide numerous examples of exactly this type of male
subjection. Analyzing same-sex sexual harassment in male prisons,
James E. Robertson explained:
Most sexual aggressors in prison . . . are heterosexual[]
[males] who define sexual aggression as affirmation of
heterosexuality ....
The first type of sexual harassment consists of comments
intended to feminize the target and are thus offensive to
most inmates....
[A]ttributes that mark inmates as effeminate or weak
make them likely targets of sexual harassment....
Being of slight stature or being a young, non-Hispanic
white male also stigmatizes one as both effeminate and weak
and thus prime sexual fodder. 128
Not only do physical attributes of targets correlate with the
feminization of young inmates, labels such as "kid" and "punk" that
are assigned to targets infantilize them and symbolically highlight
the subordination of youth. 129
B. Gender Policing
Katherine Franke further explored same-sex harassment,
sexuality, and sex-role stereotypes in her discussion of the
"technology of sexism."1 30 She suggested that sexual harassment
produces "gendered bodies" and enforces the hetero-feminization of
women and the hetero-masculinization of men.1 31 She resisted the
126 Id. at 204.
127 LARRY S. MILLER, HARDNESS OF HEART/HARDNESS OF LIFE: THE STAIN OF HUMAN
INFANTICIDE 29 (2000).
128 James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual
Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 18 (1999).
129 DROBAC, supra note 110, at 603 n.21.
130 Franke, Sexual Harassment, supra note 14, at 693.
131 Id. at 762.
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notion that the harassment of non-masculine males meant their
subordination as feminine objects. 132 Instead, she insisted that legal
theory acknowledges that men might be harassed "as a way of
policing masculinity, which may or may not have the collateral
damage of vilifying femininity."133  MacKinnon also discussed
gender identity, sex roles, and sex role enforcement in her
subordination theory.1 34 No matter the angle one takes, one can
acknowledge the value of a perspective that focuses on gender traits
and not simply on biological sex.
Franke did not, however, immediately equate same-sex male
sexual "horseplay"135  and "bagging" as having a gendered
disciplinary or regulating function.1 36 If not explicitly endorsing the
characterization, she repeated the description of such behavior as
"unnecessary juvenile behavior by aggressive male co-workers."1 37
If it does not exemplify gender policing (and it may), this conduct
arguably resembles the male self-assertive reinforcement of
heterosexuality and power in prisons noted by Robertson. The
description also specifically labels this reinforcement as juvenile.
Why? My guess is that people think of sexual bullying and
"horseplay" as a socializing and stratifying behavior common to
adolescent boys. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., the
Court equated male-on-male horseplay with "ordinary
socializing."138
It is possible that such socializing, in fact, marks the
establishment of a gendered hierarchy and the policing of gender
norms, a socialization process that begins during adolescence. I
hope social-anthropologists will investigate this question. What
becomes clear in this discussion, though, is that harassment may
constitute not only the subordination of the disfavored sex (females),
132 Id. at 758.
133 Id.
134 See MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 151-58.
135 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
136 See Franke, Sexual Harassment, supra note 14, at 767-68. Franke explained:
"Bagging" is a practice whereby "one man would walk past another and make a feinting
motion with his hand toward the other's groin." Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372,
1374-75 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Quick alleges that at least twelve different male co-workers
bagged him on some 100 occasions," and that when he complained of this behavior, his
employer "told him that the next time somebody bagged him 'to turn around and bag the
shit out of them."').
Id. at 767 n.400.
137 Id. at 767-68 (quoting Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa
1995), rev'd, 90 F.3d 1372, 1380 (8th Cir. 1996)).
138 523 U.S. at 81.
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but also those individuals who exhibit or are assigned untraditional
gender traits and youth. It also highlights the intersectional nature
of sexual harassment. 139
C. Subordination in Context
Both Vicki Schultz and Kathryn Abrams contributed to the
evolution of sexual harassment legal theory by integrating gender
discrimination and sex-based subordination. 140 Focusing on gender
enforcement and the masculine hierarchy of the workplace, Abrams
discussed how sexual harassment robs women of the new work
opportunities open to them. 141  It undermines agency for both
nonconforming men and women. 142 By focusing on the workplace,
Abrams saw that the sexually charged workplace evidences an
authorization of male sexual initiative, masculine norms, and male
hierarchical dominance.143 Operating within the framework of Title
VII, Abrams made a strong point about not losing sight of the
venue. 144
Schultz emphasized not the sexual nature of sexual harassment,
but its sex-based nature. She suggested:
Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of harassment
are actions that are designed to maintain work-particularly
the more highly rewarded lines of work-as bastions of
masculine competence and authority....
... The focus of harassment law should not be on sexuality
as such. The focus should be on conduct that consigns people
to gendered work roles that do not further their own
aspirations or advantage. 145
139 See generally Dorothy Roberts, The Collective Injury of Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 365, 370-72 (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black
Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21 (1991); Judith A. Winston, Mirror,
Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 796-801 (1991).
140 Abrams, supra note 14, at 1169; Schultz, supra note 14.
141 Abrams, supra note 14, at 1195-98.
142 Id. at 1220.
143 Id. at 1205-17.
144 Id. at 1219; see also Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se
as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. Rev. 345 (1980).
145 Schultz, supra note 14, at 1687, 1689.
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Take this emphasis on gendered roles and venue and focus not on
the entry of women into male dominated workplaces but on the
entry of adolescents into adult dominated workplaces.
In 2006, Robert Bozick published his findings regarding the
relationship between employment and first sexual intercourse for
young teens. 146 He wanted to know whether work influenced teen
sexual development. 147 He tested two hypotheses: the opportunity-
cost hypothesis1 48 and the precocious development hypothesis. He
hypothesized:
In the precocious development hypothesis, involvement in an
adult role at an early age may lead adolescents to
prematurely view themselves as adults, resulting in early
experimentation with other adult behaviors. Participation in
the workforce, therefore, should be associated with an
increased likelihood of early sexual behavior. Additionally,
teens who hold jobs in adult environments, such as
restaurants and retail stores, where they have less parental
supervision and greater exposure to older teens and adults,
should have higher odds of early first sexual intercourse than
teens who hold jobs normative for their age, such as
babysitting or mowing lawns.1 49
While nuanced details of his fascinating study are beyond the
scope of this Article, Bozick found that work experiences
significantly influence twelve to fourteen year olds. 150 Specifically,
young adolescents who work eleven to twenty hours per week
engage in early sexual intercourse at a rate seventy-one percent
higher than nonworkers. 151 Young adolescents working at adult
jobs engage in sexual intercourse at a rate seventy-nine percent
higher than nonworkers. 152 Bozick determined that "[w]orking in a
youth job has no bearing on the odds of engaging in sexual
146 Robert Bozick, Precocious Behaviors in Early Adolescence: Employment and the
Transition to First Sexual Intercourse, 26 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 60 (2006).
147 Id. at 61.
148 Bozick explained:
The opportunity-cost hypothesis .. .predicts that young adults who have strong ties to
the labor force will perceive there to be viable and achievable economic opportunities and
consequently refrain from risky behaviors that could potentially jeopardize their chances
of attainment. Sexual behavior in this sense is considered risky as it could lead to
unwanted pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases.
Id. at 63.
149 Id. at 65.
150 Id. at 66.
151 Id. at 74.
152 Id. at 78.
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intercourse in the early teen years."153 He concluded that the data
supported the premise of the precocious development hypothesis. 154
Stunned? Consider next that none of these children had reached
the age of consent by any state's standard. 155
Of course, Bozick's study does not shed light on several concerns
important to the issue of adolescent sexual harassment. First, the
transition to first sexual activity may be completely welcome for
these youths. If the sex is consensual, that fact might distinguish it
from conduct complained of by harassed adult workers who find
sexual conduct unwelcome. With that thought, however, we also
return to the question of whether a twelve year old has the capacity
or power to consent. 5 6 If not, the conduct might be equated at law
with adult sexual harassment.
Second, the data does not reveal with whom these children are
having sex, whether with their peers, adult co-workers, or others. 157
We also know nothing of the mutuality of that sex.158 I am
reminded of Fineran's finding that seventy-two percent of the
harassers in her study of female high school workers were
reportedly older than their targets. 159  However, it would be
irresponsible to correlate the information from that study with
Bozick's. I suggest again that this problem begs for research.
In a land of speculation, let us hypothesize that many sexual
partners are male adult co-workers or supervisors. Kathryn
Abrams's concerns then resurface: it is possible that these teens are
being socialized at work to the validity of male sexual initiative,
masculine norms, and male hierarchical dominance. 60 Moreover,
we must reconsider Chamallas's discussion of equality and
mutuality' 6' and question how equal a fourteen-year-old fast food
restaurant worker and her adult supervisor really are. How
163 Id.
164 Id. at 80. According to Bozick, several studies "suggest that opportunities in the labor
force suppress risky sexual behavior among older adolescents and young adults." Id. at 64.
These studies examined the use of birth control and the incidents of pregnancy, however, and
did not appear to focus on sexual development generally.
155 See generally Drobac, Sex in the Workplace, supra note 6, at 546 app. A (providing the
age of consent" from statutes in all fifty states).
156 See generally Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children:
A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 983 (1993)
(questioning whether children have the capacity to consent).
157 See Bozick, supra note 146, at 69-73 (not considering adolescent partners as variables).
15s See id. (not considering mutuality as a variable).
159 See Fineran & Gruber, supra note 9, at 11.
160 See Abrams, supra note 14, at 1204-17.
161 See Chamallas, supra note 27, at 815.
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mutually beneficial is their sexual encounter?
Catharine MacKinnon also spoke to socialization. She explained:
Sexual harassment as a working condition often does not
require a decisive yes or no to further involvement .... Since
communicated resistance means that the woman ceases to
fill the implicit job qualifications, women learn, with their
socialization to perform wifelike tasks, ways to avoid the
open refusals that anger men and produce repercussions.' 62
Are adolescent girls learning wife-like tasks? Are their brains
being hardwired with those lessons? Again in the land of
speculation, one might answer these questions in the affirmative
with the precocious development hypothesis. More research
regarding the details of teen sexual activity, teen employment, and
adolescent sexual harassment will answer some of these questions.
D. Beyond Subordination Theory
During the last decade, sexual harassment theory has evolved
beyond MacKinnon's subordination theory. Summarizing what she
saw as the problem, Linda Kelly Hill wrote:
Yet despite feminism's hegemonic strength, feminist
theory is on the brink of self-annihilation. After waves of
liberal, radical, and cultural feminism, we are now riding a
"third wave" of feminism that risks crashing into
nothingness. The permutations of feminist legal theory have
proliferated to the point of endangering feminism's existence.
... [T]o truly recognize the freedom of women and men,
the ubiquity of patriarchy cannot be presumed. 163
Kelly Hill emphasized a focus on the abominable conduct rather on
its motivation. 164
In her review essay, Elizabeth Anderson recognized equality
theory-including sexual equality, economic equality, and formal
equality-but also described two alternative approaches which
provide relief where equality theory may not.165 She suggested that
162 MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 44.
163 Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REV. 133,
135, 186 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
164 Id. at 186.
165 Elizabeth Anderson, Recent Thinking About Sexual Harassment: A Review Essay, 34
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 284, 290-92 (2006).
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equality theory best addresses injuries among social groups.166
About the alternatives, she explained:
Sexual autonomy theories view sexual harassment as an
oppressive enforcement of conventional sexist and
homophobic norms of gender and sexuality. It forces people
to conform to these norms, and punishes anyone who
deviates. . . . These theories seek to protect individual
freedom of sexual expression.
Dignity theories abstract from the possibly sexist or
homophobic intent and effects of harassing behavior, locating
the wrong instead in the means harassers use to achieve
their objectives. . . . Dignity theories uphold conventional
norms of respect for individuals, rather than challenging
conventional norms of gender and sexuality. 167
Both of these theories, imported to remedy sexual harassment,
serve without insisting on a challenge to a perceived patriarchal
order.
One can immediately envision the utility of both sexual autonomy
theory and dignity theory in a comprehensive theoretical scheme
designed to bolster the prohibition of sexual harassment of teen
workers. Drawing from the pansexual perspective, we acknowledge
that teens are sexual beings. A theory of sexual autonomy
underscores the importance of permitting an adolescent to explore
her sexuality in a safe, age-appropriate manner, without moralistic
repression. A theory of dignity secures for her a basic level of
respect as an individual. If combined with both a subordination
theory and the notion that adolescents belong to one or more
subordinated groups, these approaches could produce a robust
theoretical base for legal protection of working teenagers.
166 Id. at 289-90.
167 Id. at 290-91. See generally Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to
Workplace Harassment in European, German, and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 139, at 582 (differentiating the European Union and German
legal reaction to sexual harassment based on dignity from the United States' legal reaction to
sexual harassment based on equality); Orit Kamir, Dignity, Respect, and Equality in Israel's
Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 139, at
561-62 (presenting the Israeli approach to sexual harassment laws); Rosa Ehrenreich,
Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment,
88 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1999) ("This article argues for a comprehensive re-examination of how
workplace harassment is conceptualized.").
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IV. PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
At a certain point, however, statistics, theory, and historic trends
frustrate the instinctual desire to protect our children-including
our older children. We might take the step that could be challenged
on every intellectual level and say, "Just do it. Protect them! To
hell with the justifications." Rather than succumb to this
iconoclastic response, let us first turn instead to psychologists and
philosophers 168 who explore what we know instinctually about
human beings. Their work offers guidance for theorizing about
sexual harassment law for teenagers.
A. Some Classic Philosophers on Children and Capacity
Moral philosophers often have not considered children to be
rational beings. For example, in his discussion of moral
responsibility, Aristotle equated children with animals. 169 He said,
"[B]oth children and animals have a share in voluntary action, but
not in choice; and we call actions done on the spur of the moment
voluntary, but not the result of choice."170 Aristotle suggested that
acts committed in ignorance were "non-voluntary" but only
"involuntary" if they subsequently caused the actor pain and
repentance. 71  Thus, according to Aristotelian philosophy, any
adolescent operating in ignorance could not act voluntarily, could
not exercise choice, and could not, therefore, consent as the law now
understands it. 172
1. The Social Contract Theorists
In her discussion of children's political and moral rights,
Katherine Federle critiqued the emphasis on juvenile incapacity by
168 I note here that, with a few exceptions, I do not cite to the original philosophers or
scientific studies but to accounts of those original works by competent experts. The aim here
is not to properly interpret any particular philosopher, but to raise and discuss ideas that are
of interest independent of pedigree.
169 THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 116 (J.A.K. Thomson trans.,
Penguin Books rev. ed. 1976).
170 Id. at 116.
171 Id. at 113.
172 See id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 14, at 457 ("According to Aristotle, 'the
deliberative faculty in the soul is not present at all in a slave; in a female it is present but
ineffective; in a child present but undeveloped.' And for Aristotle there could be no good life
without reason ...." (footnotes omitted)).
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many political and moral philosophers. 173 She provided a valuable
review of perspectives, beginning with seventeenth and eighteenth
century philosophers. 174 While a complete analysis of her work is
beyond the scope of this Article, a summary of her conclusions adds
value to this exploration of sexual harassment legal theory. First,
Federle related that the Social Control theorists, such as Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, believed "that
children have no freedom because of their incompetencies and are
instead subject to parental authority until they attain capacity."1 75
Locke thought that reason and knowledge develop incrementally
through experience.' 76 The more experience and reason children
acquire, the less protection they need. 177  Thus, parents, and
ultimately the state, were charged with the welfare of children until
they reached maturity.1 78 Influenced by the Enlightenment, these
men determined that only those persons who could engage in
rational thought and choice merited freedom and political power. 179
Incompetency did not merely limit rights; it negated them
completely.180 Children enjoyed neither freedom nor autonomy
because of their incapacity.
173 Federle, supra note 156, at 987.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 987. Anita Bernstein noted that Rousseau held similarly disparaging views
concerning women. Bernstein, supra note 14, at 457 ("Rousseau denounced women as
incapable of thought and unsuited to education; his 'highest accolade' for a woman was 'Oh
lovely ignorant fair!" (footnotes omitted)).
176 Federle, supra 156, at 991, 994.
177 Jennifer Soper, Straddling the Line: Adolescent Pregnancy and Questions of Capacity,
23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 195, 198 (1999) (citing DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND
CHILDHOOD 2-10, 25 (1993)). This belief appears consistent with a notion of "developing
capacity."
178 Id. Federle explained, "But the social compact theorists articulated a vision of
childhood and family that influenced their own jurisprudence as well as present notions about
children and parents. It is to these familial power relationships that the social compact
theorists analogize when speaking of the state's authority over its own citizens." Federle,
supra note 156, at 987-88; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions.").
179 Federle, supra note 156, at 987-95. Bernstein explained that Hobbes and Locke
ignored women in their political discussions. Bernstein, supra note 14, at 457 ("Hobbes,
Locke, and Adam Smith, did not craft misogynous aphorisms about reason as they
constructed their view of the state. Rather, their writings, which refer continually to the
individual, presume the absence of women's thought, consent, and decisionmaking.").
180 Federle, supra note 156, at 995.
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2. Further Perspectives on Children and Rationality
Second, Federle reviewed Utilitarian and, later, Legal Positivist
views.181 Like the Social Contract theorists, Utilitarians and Legal
Positivists also rejected the idea that children could reason
effectively. 182 Federle distinguished the Utilitarians, including
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, from the Social Contract
theorists: "Although, in utilitarian terms, capacity is the ability to
make rational choices in the pursuit of happiness (rather than the
competence to consent under social contract theory), it is that
capacity which circumscribes governmental interference with
individual autonomy."183  The Legal Positivists-including H.L.A.
Hart-also equated capacity with rational thought.184 Hart
contended that rational ability empowered individuals to affect the
application of law and the exercise of rights.18 5 For both groups,
juvenile irrationality meant a lack of capacity and a lack of political
power.
Federle also discussed moral philosophers and specifically
Immanuel Kant. She summarized Kant's views on children:
Children are passive citizens in Kant's political state
because they are dependent upon their parents for their
support, and, although they do have certain moral rights
which spring from their innate right to freedom, children
lack the capacity Kant associated with greater liberty and
political participation....
. ..Kant does not dispute the centrality of capacity to
concepts of freedom and autonomy; consequently, the rights
children have are protective rights that depend upon others
for enforcement. 86
This passage confirms that while still endorsing the incapacity of
children,18 7 Kant reasoned that children are born with rights that
181 See id. at 995, 1009.
182 Id. at 990, 999, 1010.
183 Id. at 998.
184 Id. at 1009-10.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1000, 1002. Anita Bernstein noted that Kant held a similarly low opinion of
women. Bernstein, supra note 14, at 457 ("Kant wrote that women were not 'capable of
principles' and that their 'philosophy is not to reason, but to sense."' (footnotes omitted)).
187 Allen Wood suggested that Kant believed that young children do not have the capacity
to set ends and, therefore, are not "persons" for purposes of ethics analysis. ALLEN W. WOOD,
KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 144 (1999). I thank R. George Wright for his gift of Allen's book
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others, including parents, enforce.188
John Rawls echoed this moral justification for examining the
rights of children. 8 9 Rawls also rejected, however, the idea "that
the mere humanness of children confers equal liberty."'190 Federle
concluded, "Rawls sees children as moral primitives who must be
protected from the 'weakness and infirmities of their reason and
will in society'; others, therefore, are authorized to act on children's
behalf in a manner most likely to secure their approval when they
become rational persons."' 9'
3. Approaching Women and Children
Even children's rights theorists, argued Federle, agree concerning
the limited capacity of some children. 92 To avoid the dilemma of
where to draw the line between capacity and incapacity, some
advocates, such as Richard Farson and John Caldwell Holt,
presume capacity to argue that children deserve the same legal and
political rights as adults. 93 Others, such as Bruce Hafen and
Joseph Goldstein, use incapacity to support the reinforcement of
parental control.194
Federle acknowledged that some theorists discuss children's
rights not by focusing on capacity but by exploring the relationships
that involve children. 95 She ultimately found this emphasis equally
unsatisfying. For example, she criticized feminists, including
Martha Minow, who distance themselves from notions of autonomy
and individuality which they view as being hierarchical and
supportive of male dominance. 96 Federle argued that concentration
on relationships "underscores children's dependencies rather than
rendering them irrelevant."'' 97 She worried that feminists might
and his emphasis of this particular point.
185 See id.
1s9 See Federle, supra note 156, at 1007.
190 Id.
,91 Id. (footnotes omitted).
192 Id. at 1011.
193 Id. at 1012.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1017. Federle noted how Ferdinand Schoeman suggested fostering intimacy
between children and adults and limiting unnecessary governmental intrusion into those
relationships. Id. Arguably, the problem of workplace sexual harassment and sex
discrimination more generally warrant governmental intrusion. Thus, that view holds little
value here.
196 Id. at 1017, 1019-20.
197 Id. at 1019.
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overlook their own power by ignoring the hierarchical relationship
between women and children.198
Federle engaged in her historical and theoretical review to argue
against the pervasive emphasis on capacity for the justification of
children's rights. She explained:
We must reconstruct rights talk about children in terms of
power, and only when we make explicit the role of capacity is
a new theory of rights for children possible....
My point here is that an adequate rights theory must
account for power. Power is the obverse of social oppression
and political inequality, for it licenses hierarchy and status.
Rights, however, mitigate the exclusionary effects of power
by allowing the powerless to access existing political and
legal structures in order to make claims. Permitting these
types of rights claims also has the salutary effect of
redistributing power and altering hierarchies. Herein lies
the real value of rights, for rights require that we respect the
marginalized, empower the powerless, and strengthen the
weak. 199
From this elucidation of the importance of children's power and
rights, Federle demonstrated that the focus on children's capacity,
and one might argue the "developing capacity" of adolescents,
disabled children who need rights to access existing political and
legal structures.200
Most people will agree that, vis-A-vis adults, children lack
political, economic, and legal power. Translate this lack to
MacKinnon's definition of sexual harassment:
Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of
a relationship of unequal power [between males and
females]. Central to the concept is the use of power derived
from one social sphere [employment] to lever benefits or
198 Id. at 1020.
199 Id. at 985-86.
200 Id. at 1025. In her concluding paragraphs, Federle endorses a nonanthropocentrist
theory of rights found in "deep ecology." Id. at 1025-27. I actually agree that this view looks
fascinating in its potential; however, I also think-perhaps too pessimistically-that we are a
long way in the evolutionary process from adopting a nonanthropocentrist justification for
political and legal rights. Because the redress of a power differential also justifies the
provision of rights, I leave this theory for another article.
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impose deprivations in another [sexual relations].201
The new definition should read:
Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of
a relationship of unequal power [between adults and teens].
Central to the concept is the use of power derived from e
[every] social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations
in another [sexual relations often deemed illegal].
The sexual harassment of minors is unique. At least women now
enjoy the right to vote, file suit in court, and serve on juries. So
when we refer to their discriminatory abuse, we know that women
nevertheless wield at least some political and legal authority.
Minors, as noted, wield little to none. Often their power-if it can
be called that-rests in the hands of the adults who purport to care
for them but who may have conflicting interests. From this
discussion of capacity and rights, we see another unique
justification for the prohibition of sexual harassment against
minors. Specifically, they enjoy even less political and legal power
than do women, nonwhite adults, and adults with untraditional
gender traits.
B. Psychology
Federle's review of philosophical perspectives concerning children
highlights a common theme: the perceived inability of children to
reason. Too many philosophers have been concerned primarily with
adult rights and capabilities and not with those of children. Second,
the defining parameters of the incapacitated group-children-are
not clear enough for specific application. Were these philosophers
referring only to infants? To young children? To adolescents?
Third, too many fail to distinguish among the types of decisions that
a child might make, or rights that a child might exercise when
contemplating capacity. They draw an "all or nothing" conclusion.
A child either has legal capacity for all purposes in all contexts or
for none. The "one size fits all" approach may not be appropriate for
children, and particularly not for adolescents who are developing
capacity.




New evidence regarding adolescent cognitive abilities proves the
inaccuracy of these classic philosophical attitudes regarding older
children and their rational capabilities, at least. Elizabeth
Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg explained, "In fact, most studies
indicate that there are few, if any, differences between the cognitive
processes of adults and adolescents. Developmental theory posits
that the cognitive capacity for logical reasoning emerges during
early adolescence-the ages of eleven and fourteen." 20 2  Thus,
adolescents possess the ability to engage in rational thought.
Therefore, the denial of political rights, power, or autonomy based
upon a lack of reasoning capacity alone is unjustified. Close the
book on hundreds of years of philosophy-at least with respect to
adolescent rationality.
This scientific confirmation of the rational capacity of even young
adolescents is wonderful news, especially for self-determinist
children's rights advocates. This information supports the notion
that adolescents have the capacity to give informed medical consent,
which is primarily determined by cognitive ability, 20 3 for procedures,
including abortion.
2. Capacity-Other Decision-making Skills
Psychologists, however, have determined that cognitive capability
is not the only trait useful for effective function and decision-
making.20 4 Other traits come into play. We know, for example, that
adolescents take more and greater risks than do adults.205 Neither
a lack of information nor cognitive capacity explains their risk-
taking tendency.206 Studies have demonstrated that increasing
knowledge does not necessarily lead people to make better
202 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995) (reporting that "reasoning
abilities do not differ markedly between middle adolescents and adults" and that "there were
few differences in health care decision-making skills between adolescents and young adults").
203 See id. at 1763-64 (describing how cognitive ability has been used as the measure of
whether a patient can make a knowing, competent, and voluntary decision to undergo a
medical procedure).
204 See id. at 1764-65 (observing that psychological traits influence decision-making).
205 See id. at 1767 (providing examples of adolescents' frequent participation in dangerous
activities). "[F]ifty-eight percent of all driving fatalities involve persons age sixteen to
twenty-four .... In addition, tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drug use begin most often between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen." Id.
206 Id. at 1771-72.
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decisions. 207 Other studies suggest that adolescents hold different
priorities than do adults. First, teens "view long-term consequences
as less important than short-term consequences." 208 Second, they
demonstrate a preference for sensation-seeking. 20 9 Third, they are
preoccupied with their own social status.210 Given these priorities,
one can see how sex with an adult co-worker might seem like a good
idea. De-emphasizing the long-term career, reputation, and health
risks, a teen might choose an exciting sexual relationship and the
concomitant status increase with an older, more "sophisticated"
man offering such a prize.
In theorizing about traits other than cognition that operate in
mature decision-making, Cauffman and Steinberg explained:
In our view, a more complete approach to considerations of
decision-making competence addresses not only the cognitive
abilities required for competent decision-making, but also
the psychosocial traits that determine whether an individual
makes good use of the cognitive tools at his or her disposal.
These psychosocial traits comprise what we call "maturity of
judgment".... [M]aturity of judgment can be further broken
down into three core components: (1) responsibility, which
includes healthy autonomy, self-reliance, and clarity of
identity; (2) perspective, or the ability to acknowledge the
complexity of a situation and see it as part of a broader
context; and (3) temperance, which refers to the ability to
limit impulsive and emotional decision-making, to-evaluate
situations thoroughly before acting (which may involve
seeking the advice of others when appropriate), and to avoid
decision-making extremes. 211
These three core components deserve greater discussion since
they may influence a decision to "consent" to sex at the workplace.
Cauffman and Steinberg cautioned, "Adolescents who demonstrate
that they meet the criteria for informed [medical] consent may
nevertheless lack the psychosocial maturity required to make
consistently mature judgments."212
207 Id. at 1772.
208 Id. at 1773.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 1764-65.




With respect to the development of responsibility, Cauffman and
Steinberg described three foci: autonomy, identity differentiation,
and ego development. 213 They noted that adolescents are most
susceptible to peer influence at about age fourteen, after which that
influence declines. 214 Studies, however, indicate that a coherent
sense of identity does not emerge until about age eighteen. 215 Ego
development or individuation, according to some studies, increases
throughout adolescent years. 216
As teens individuate, other people exert influences that affect
various aspects of adolescent life. For example, parents influence
adolescents in matters of religion and career choice whereas peers
sway choices regarding daily concerns such as clothing and music
preferences. 21 7  Cauffman and Steinberg suggested that
"adolescents' display of independence-and hence, maturity of
judgment-may be highly situation-specific, with youngsters being
influenced more on some topics than others, and by different
sources of influence to differing degrees, depending on the decision
in question."218
Because little research has been done correlating responsibility
development, various specific ages, and maturity of judgment,
psychologists hesitate to draw any conclusions for the practical
application of what they do know.219  This new information,
however, raises several important questions for our purposes. For
example, who influences an adolescent's decision to have sex with
her supervisor? A parent? Her peers? Only the boss? Moreover, if
she has not formed a coherent independent identity, should we
consider her "consent" to sex with an adult co-worker legally
significant?
b. Temperance
Several factors contribute to personal temperance. Preliminary
studies of childhood impulsivity suggest that it remains relatively
213 Id. at 1774, 1776, 1778.
214 Id. at 1775.
215 Id. at 1776.
216 Id. at 1778-79.
217 Id. at 1774-75.
218 Id. at 1775.
219 Id. at 1780.
[Vol. 70
Sexual Harassment of Working Adolescents
stable until age sixteen when it increases and then again stabilizes
at age nineteen.220 Impulsivity declines during adulthood. 221 More
investigation is needed regarding the relation between impulsivity,
sensation-seeking, and judgmental maturity. 222 Stress and mood
state also influence temperate decision-making. 223 Studies indicate
that middle adolescents exhibit greater mood volatility than do
adults.224 Again, more investigation is needed to correlate these
factors with maturity of judgment. If we can, however, say that
adolescents are more impulsive and moody, we can anticipate
another issue. Do adolescent impulsivity and moodiness combine
with stress (on-the-job pressure for sex) to influence a teen's
decision-making process? Should the law regard teen "consent,"
given impulsively and under stress, as significant and legally
binding?
c. Perspective
A third trait, perspective, allows someone to frame a decision in
context, taking a broader view that would include potential
consequences, impact on other people, and the "cost-benefit
calculus." 225 Teens demonstrate improvement in abstract and less
egocentric thinking until about age seventeen or eighteen.226
Research suggests that development of future-time orientation
"continues beyond mid-adolescence, at least through the last year of
college."227  Cauffman and Steinberg could not draw firm
conclusions regarding perspective and maturity of judgment due to
insufficient correlative research.22  If there is a correlation,
however, one might reasonably conclude that an inability to see "the
big picture" could influence a teen's decision to have sex with an
adult co-worker.




224 Id. at 1782.
225 Id. at 1783-84.
226 Id. at 1784-85.




3. Does Adolescent Capacity Even Matter?
We began this discussion of psychology and adolescent
psychosocial development to evaluate the validity of classic
philosophical conclusions that discounted juvenile rational capacity.
We can conclude that the philosophers were wrong about adolescent
cognitive ability; however, the research regarding adolescent
psychosocial development is relatively new and ongoing. We cannot
draw many other firm conclusions. We should at least question,
though, whether adolescent "consent" to sex should have legal
significance and whether it should be legally binding.
a. Physical Appearance
Assume for a moment that such "consent" should not be legally
binding because adolescents do not have the power, (equal) status,
and/or competence to consent to sex with an adult co-worker. Will
jurists account for adolescent developing capacity, status, and power
in their allocation of rights and liabilities?
Donald Kramer and Jennifer Soper suggest that while many
people claim to base the attribution of rights on competency, they
often judge competency and assign rights based on physical
appearance. 229 Thus, society treats the children who look physically
mature as adults, whether or not those adolescents are emotionally,
neurologically, and psychosocially mature. For an example of this
phenomenon, examine the statutory rape defenses. Under this
criminal scheme, a minor lacks capacity even if she "consents," so
her "consent" is no defense. Her physical maturity, however, might
constitute one. In California, the perpetrator's mistake of age
particularly of older victims-arguably based on physical
maturity--comprises a defense. 230
Even if we cannot yet make firm conclusions regarding adolescent
"developing capacity" and judgmental maturity, we should at least
avoid confusing physical maturity with neurological and
psychosocial maturity as we assign legal rights and duties. Neither
the blooming of the adult body or its withering with disease or old
age necessarily equates with mental maturity or acuity.
229 Soper, supra note 177, at 199.
230 See Phipps, supra note 116, at 52 n.219 (citing People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal.
1964)).
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b. "Consent" in Different Contexts
As we consider whether or not adolescents have the threshold
level of competence, sufficient power, and status to give legally
significant consent to sex, we must return to the context. Sexual
harassment by definition is not consensual. No one freely chooses to
be sexually harassed. Some adolescents, however, may "consent" to
sexual activity without fully appreciating to what they are
"consenting" or why. The context and nature of the decision may
veil the nature of the proposed activity. Additionally, teens may not
have the power to refuse a sex solicitation. If we suggest, however,
that adolescents may be incapable of consenting to sex with an
adult co-worker, then we run the risk of invalidating consent in
contexts that we might wish to permit teen "consent," such as for
abortion and other medical treatment. If possible, we need to
distinguish the two contexts since I do not want to craft a
theoretical basis for sexual harassment law that undermines a
teen's access to abortion or other medical services. 231
A responsible abortion choice typically requires information and
will lead to change: the termination-or not-of an undesired
pregnancy. When confronted with an undesired pregnancy, most
women who contemplate abortion have access to information and
professional guidance from the people providing the medical service
at least. They may also have the benefit of advice from a partner,
parents, and other advisors. The choice to have an abortion is
typically an informed one. Passivity about the choice will likely
result in significant change: the birth of a child. There is little
debate about the result and the potential medical risks of
abortion. 232  What produces huge debate is the morality of
abortion.233  Thus, this abortion choice is arguably complex
because-while information is available-both action and
forbearance result in significant consequences with moral
implications.
Responsible sexual intimacy also arguably requires information
about safety and consequences. One can find information about
231 1 thank Mary Anne Case for emphasizing this concern that I share. Mary Anne, I hope
this discussion suffices for our adolescents.
232 See generally MedlinePlus, Abortion, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
abortion.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) (providing links to various sources discussing the
result and potential risks of abortions).
233 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise-Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 921, 933-35 (1992) (examining underlying issues in the debate about abortion).
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safety through a variety of free services, including the public library
and the Internet. 234 Information on consequences, however, other
than pregnancy and sexual transmitted diseases, is harder to find.
Where does one find out how sex will change a relationship? Where
can a person find out how sex will affect his or her emotional well-
being? How can a person know whether the experience will be
"good" or worth potential risks?
Certainly, people can ask professionals-such as psychologists-
for advice about sexual activity; however, accessing such
professional information involves more effort than stopping by the
public library and is often expensive. Additionally, many people do
not feel comfortable talking about sex so they do not ask for advice
about it. Moreover, asking someone-even a professional-whether
you will like sex with a particular partner is a bit like asking
whether you will like spumoni ice cream. I have never tried
spumoni so I would be at a loss to advise you. And even if you were
asking about vanilla, I would want to know whether you are trying
it during a heat wave or in the middle of a blizzard. The
circumstances might make a difference. Additionally, people often
do not anticipate needing this information. My guess is that most
people do not make an appointment to have sex for the first time
with a new partner. I suspect that the decision to have sex is often
more spontaneous and informal than even the choice to have an ice
cream cone.
With sexual intimacy, the failure to participate does not disturb
the status quo. Thus, no action means no change. However, as with
abortion, morality colors the choice of whether to engage in sex-
especially outside of marriage. We covered that territory with the
Traditional View. 235
Now consider both decisions concerning abortion and sexual
relations with an adolescent female as the decision-maker. If she
has the competence and therefore the capacity to make a legally
valid choice, we have no problem. However, often we do not know
and cannot tell whether she has the capacity to make the decision to
make a mature judgment. So let us assume-perhaps wrongly-
that she does not have capacity and consider whether she should
234 See, e.g., MedlinePlus, Safe Sex, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/
001949.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) (discussing sexually transmitted diseases and safe
sex).
235 See supra Part II.A.
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make the choice anyway.236 Several factors should influence us as
we decide whether the adolescent should have the right to .make a
choice: (1) the risk of her injury from no choice; (2) the availability of
assistance for a healthy choice if she has the right to choose; (3)
available remedies if she changes her mind; and (4) the accuracy
with which we can evaluate options for her or second-guess her
choice.
First, if a pregnant teen has no right to choose abortion, her
guardians will decide for her and she loses a valuable learning
experience in the choice process. 237 Her guardians may also require
her to give birth to a child. Adolescent childbearing is highly
risky. 238  According to the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), pregnancy is the leading cause of death for fifteen- to
nineteen-year-old females worldwide. 239  The World Health
Organization describes adolescent childbearing as "profoundly
disempowering." 240 It "cuts short her education, severely limits her
income-earning capacity and impairs her ability to make well
informed choices about life."241  Thus, the risk of no choice is
potentially high.
Second, if she has an abortion right, a teen will have medical
professionals and probably other adults to advise her regarding
health and other consequences. 242 Moreover, the process of making
236 One might argue that the right to liberty guaranteed by the United States Constitution
protects her right to make a choice in both cases. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding a substantive due process right to make
decisions about adult private sexual conduct, but not extending that right to minors); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (finding a right to privacy and abortion
services for minors); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (finding a right to
procreate).
237 Of course, she could choose an illegal abortion or to terminate the pregnancy herself.
The risks of both those options are obvious.
238 See generally NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, NOT JUST ANOTHER
SINGLE ISSUE: TEEN PREGNANCY PREVENTION'S LINK TO OTHER CRITICAL SOCIAL ISSUES
(2002), available at http://www.teenpregnancy.org/resources/data/pdf/notjust.pdf (discussing
the social, economic, and health risks associated with teen pregnancy).
239 INNOCENTI RESEARCH CTR., UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, EARLY MARRIAGE:
CHILD SPOUSES 11 (2001), available at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/
digest7e.pdf.
240 ADOLESCENT HEALTH AND DEV. PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE SECOND
DECADE: IMPROVING ADOLESCENT HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (1998), available at
http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/docs/improving-adolescenthealth.pdf.
241 Id.
242 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Consent or Notification for
Minors' Abortions, http://www4.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/
abortionlfact-parental-consent.xml (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) (confirming that thirty-five




the decision will be a learning experience. Even if the choice
consists of two unattractive options, she may at least have the
psychological satisfaction of choosing the option that she deems the
lesser of two evils.
No remedy exists for a teen if she changes her mind once she has
terminated a pregnancy. She cannot undo the procedure. Nor
would we allow her to sue medical providers for damages-absent
negligence or medical malpractice-since they acted to help her.
The injury that the adolescent suffers comes not from the abortion
procedure but from the undesired pregnancy (facilitated by someone
else). The medical procedure was designed to terminate the
injurious pregnancy. Thus, no good could come from permitting the
withdrawal of "consent" to the abortion.
Finally, no matter which choice she makes, to either continue or
terminate the pregnancy, few adults can say with certainty that she
made an incorrect or unwise choice. While some people view
abortion as morally wrong, intelligent, capable people disagree.
Additionally, we should not conflate the moral correctness of the
choice with the more practical, factual considerations. The
pregnant adolescent either gives birth to another child or endures
an abortion. The statistics regarding the outcomes for teens and
their children 243 speak to the practical realities. Who can say with
absolute authority which is morally worse: the handicapping of two
lives or the termination of (the potential for) one.
With respect to the decision to have sex with an adult co-worker,
the first consideration is really a non-issue. We cannot realistically
control whether adolescents have sex; they just do it. We can
control access to safe, legal abortion services but short of isolating
every adolescent on a mountain peak or mandating modern chastity
belts, we cannot completely control their access to sex.
243 The Washington State Department of Health determined:
Infants born to teen mothers are one and a third times more likely to be born
prematurely, and 50 percent more likely to be low birthweight babies (under 5.5 pounds).
Low birthweight and prematurity raise the probability of a number of adverse
conditions, including infant death, blindness, deafness, mental retardation and cerebral
palsy.
Children born to single teenage mothers "are more likely to drop out of school, to give
birth out of wedlock, to divorce or separate, and to become dependent on welfare,
compared to children with older parents." Sons of adolescent mothers are almost 3 times
more likely to be incarcerated than sons of mothers who delay childbearing until older.
Washington State Department of Health, Public Fact Sheet: Teen Pregnancy,
http://www.doh.wa.gov/Topics/teenpreg.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
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If we remove the stigma concerning nonmarital sex and permit it,
teens might access more information about it. The problem
remains, however, that sufficient information may be unavailable
given the uniqueness and complexity of each circumstance and
liaison. Thus, we should assume that inexperienced youths may not
even be able to access sufficient information to make an informed
choice about intimate sexual relations.
Are there available remedies if she changes her mind? If she
realizes-within a reasonable time frame-that she did not have
sufficient capacity to consent, can we help her? Here is where the
decision to have an abortion and the decision to have sex with an
adult co-worker differ most prominently. While a teen cannot
change her mind about abortion, she can about the advisability of
her "consent" to sex. 244 We can and do prosecute adults for having
sex with minors. Thus, we could permit a teen to withdraw her
"consent" if she found that she made an uninformed or unwise
choice and sue her adult partner. Unlike the medical services
provider, the adult partner was probably acting on his own behalf,
not (just) hers. We assume that adults know the law and can
conform to it. We routinely hold them responsible when they do not.
Therefore, instead of imposing on the minor the costs of the
detrimental choice, we redirect those costs to the adult who should
have known better-whether or not the act was illegal-and could
have refrained from sex with the minor.
Finally, while adults might differ regarding the appropriateness
of a pregnancy termination decision, fewer will argue with a teen
who determines she should not have had sex with an adult co-
worker. Assuming no fraud, adults should agree that once a teen
acknowledges an immature error, facilitated by a responsible adult,
we should assist her in remedying the problem. Some adults, such
as Judge Posner, may blame the teen for bringing her injuries upon
herself-or for not being more mentally mature when she looks
physically mature. If behavior is truly the result of immaturity,
however, a natural developmental condition, then there should be
no associated blame. We do not blame the blind for their inability to
see, and we should not blame youth for their inability to act
maturely.
One might argue that a remedy in the form of money damages is
244 Obviously, a teen cannot recapture his or her virginity and monetary damages will
never make the teen "whole"; however, he or she can mitigate the negative consequences by
covering medical expenses, psychological counseling, and costs of lost opportunities.
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not fair to the adult who relied on the "consent" or the employer who
hired the seducer. The adult, however, was always free to refrain
from the liaison that he knew could ultimately result in withdrawn
"consent." One might say that he assumed the risk. Additionally,
the employer is able to monitor its workplace and select its agents.
If it fails to do either, the principal rests in a better place to cover
the damage costs otherwise borne by the employed minor.
c. Capacity Matters If It Exists-But Who Knows?
The advantage of permitting "consent" in both contexts is that we
avoid violating the rights of those teens who, unbeknownst to us,
have developed the threshold level of capacity to deliver meaningful
consent. By allowing a teen to withdraw "consent" in certain
situations such as those involving contracts and sexual relations
with adults, we avoid some of the damage that results from
assuming capacity where it does not exist. Moreover, while we
cannot completely prevent injury to those teens who "consent" to
sexual relations, we can deter their prospective adult partners and
later facilitate a remedy for any damage done to teens who realize
that they lacked the capacity, power, or status to consent.
One day we may know when any given teen develops the
threshold level of competence and, therefore, capacity to make
legally binding, significant decisions. Until then, we need to
acknowledge their developing capacity and help them transition
into adulthood and the myriad decisions that they will face. The
transition process typically includes some kind of apprenticeship in
the workforce. Adolescents need to develop a work ethic and job
skills. Thus, adults should facilitate this transition into labor. As
scientists continue to research adolescent psychosocial, neurological,
and sexual development, jurists and legal theorists should pursue
one additional avenue for investigation regarding the sexual
harassment of teens. Specifically, the philosophy of ethics may offer
guidance for dealing with adolescent "consent" to sex with an adult
co-worker.
V. KANTIAN ETHICS
While Immanuel Kant believed in the incapacity of children,
scientific studies evidence the rational cognitive abilities of
adolescents; therefore, Kant's discussion of the treatment of rational
beings may have some application for adolescents. His views on
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ethical conduct as expressed in the "categorical imperative" offer an
attractive framework for exploring the treatment of adolescents
without imposing extraneous moral judgments.
A. Humanity, Morality, Means, and Ends
Allen Wood summarized Kant's conclusions concerning morality:
Kant's theory maintains that to act morally is always to
act for the sake of a person, or more precisely, for the sake of
humanity in someone's person. In following a categorical
imperative, the determining ground of the will is the
objective worth of humanity or rational nature, as an object
of respect. From this standpoint, all conduct is regarded
fundamentally from the standpoint of what it expresses about
the agent's attitude toward humanity. Morally good conduct
expresses respect for humanity as an existent end, while bad
conduct is bad because it expresses disrespect or contempt
for humanity.245
Thus, respect for "humanity," which Kant defined as the rational
nature of human beings, 246 constitutes moral conduct. With "The
Formula of the End in Itself," Kant proposed treating humanity
always as an end and "never merely as a means" to an end.247 We
use another person as a tool, as a mere means to an end, when our
proposed activity reflects an underlying principle to which the other
could not consent.248 Clearly, rational and informed consent matter
in this maxim.
Kant further distinguished humanity in his discussion of
"personality." According to Allen Wood, "[p]ersonality seems
'higher' than humanity in that it has essential reference to moral
value, moral responsibility, and the 'positive' concept of freedom,
where humanity includes none of these. But Kant has at least two
reasons for choosing humanity rather than personality as the end in
245 WOOD, supra note 187, at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
246 Id. at 118.
247 R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of a
Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 271 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, Treating Persons]
(quoting IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary Gregor
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785)); see also WOOD, supra note 187, at 119-20
(discussing Kant's means to an end).
248 See Onora O'Neill, The Moral Perplexities of Famine and World Hunger, in MATTERS OF
LIFE AND DEATH: NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 294, 319-24 (Tom




itself. '249 Wood concluded that the capacity for rational choice, and
not the virtuosity of a particular choice or obedience to moral laws,
comprises the fundamental value of human beings. 250
With reference to dignity, R. George Wright elaborated on this
Kantian concept of humanity. Wright suggested, "If people have the
capacity to make rational moral choices freely, autonomously, and
self-originatingly, beyond being pulled about mechanically by the
tugs of nature, that capacity will be the source and embodiment of
moral worth, dignity, and their status as ends in themselves." 251
What indicates value and dignity is free choice, not necessarily the
moral correctness of any choice. 252 Are adolescents capable of free,
autonomous, self-originating moral choices? Are they beyond the
tugs of nature or peers, parents or adult co-workers? Adolescents
may be developing the capacity of free moral choice but may not
have completed the process.
Let us assume, however, that all human beings are at some basic
level dignified.253 Even babies, who do not engage, and may not
even have the capacity to engage, in independent moral
deliberation, possess something like inherent if unactualized
dignity-if only because of their potential for rationality, moral
development, and growth. I find no value in discussing a world in
which human beings have no worth or dignity simply because they
do not always engage in moral deliberation. 254 Thus, I start with
the proposition that any cogitant human being possesses some basic
level of dignity and worth.255 Moving from that proposition, I find it
249 WOOD, supra note 187, at 120.
250 Id. at 120-21.
251 Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
252 My thanks to R. George Wright for clarifying this point.
253 See R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity
Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397 (1995) [hereinafter Wright, Consenting Adults]. Wright
acknowledged many conceptions of dignity and proffered:
Dignity is, in our sense, a matter of what one is, or of one's status as a person. It relates
to how one deserves to be treated by other people. Dignity is a matter of respect-
worthiness, or of intrinsic worth that calls for respect. Dignity is thus, on most views, a
matter of taking persons seriously as persons.
Id. at 1398 (footnotes omitted).
254 I offer a crass and ungrammatical modification of Ren6 Descartes' famous contention
and assert, "I think; therefore, I end." In other words, I suggest that because I think, I
deserve to be treated not merely as a means but also as an end. In sum, anyone who thinks
possesses dignity, the end.
255 I would also argue for the dignity of human beings whose neurological functions have
ceased but who continue to live. While no cogitative potential remains for persons in a
perpetual vegetative state, I would acknowledge their dignity as something that survives the
extinguishing of both brain and heart function. There is dignity in the human memory of a
former human being. I also realize that the reliance on cogitation means that other beings,
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indisputable that adolescents, who demonstrate rational cognitive
ability, deserve to be treated as ends and not merely as means.
B. The Categorical Imperative, Sexual Harassment, and Consent
Using Kant's categorical imperative to evaluate sexual
harassment, we might all agree that in the most obvious and
egregious cases, the harasser uses the target merely as a means to a
particular end. However, does hostile work environment sexual
harassment that targets no one person violate this categorical
imperative? Does the harasser violate the imperative when the
target acquiesces or consents?
1. Sexual Harassment
Wright applied Kantian ethics to the issue of adult sexual
harassment and opined: "[o]nly when the Kantian formula is taken
with proper seriousness can all common forms of sexual harassment
be clearly seen as violating that formula."256 The harasser's end
may vary and could include sexual gratification, a satisfying sense
of power and domination, or a desire to isolate and exclude a person
through oppression and insult.257 "A harasser might implicitly
envision his victim as capable of rationality and moral law making,
and thus not a mere thing."258 The harasser may not even be aware
of his end or consider his target.259 A target might, in the abstract,
consent to the harasser's sexual gratification. However, we would
not label the conduct harassment if the target would or could truly
consent to the behavior. Wright concluded, "A faithful Kantian will
instead see sexual harassment as . . . tending to inhibit the
otherwise possible development of the target's capacities for rational
deliberation and choice on the job. Sexual harassment also fails to
minimally cooperate with the victim's morally permissible projects,
including animals, might also possess dignity and worth. I cannot argue with this extension.
Do animals deserve to be treated as ends and not merely as means? I will, with
acknowledged cowardice, leave that question for another day. All of this exploration extends
far beyond our purpose here.
256 Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 296.
257 Wright anticipated that some harassers might fear women and their movement into
traditionally male dominated workplaces. He noted, "Kant insightfully observes that
someone can be the object of fear, yet not the object of respect." Id. at 298.
258 Id. at 297; see also Hill, supra note 163, at 185 (challenging the notion that sexual
harassment necessarily perpetuates a patriarchal hierarchy).
259 Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 297.
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chosen by her in her own way."260 Thus, sexual harassment always
violates the categorical imperative.
2. Consent
The issue of consent deserves more attention, however, since
under Title VII, consent is a complete defense to a charge of sexual
harassment. Both Onora O'Neill and R. George Wright analyzed
adult consent in the context of Kant's philosophy.261 While O'Neill
focused on the treatment of "others as persons,"262 Wright explored
"[h]uman dignity."263 They each discussed the notion of capacity264
and probed "morally significant"265 or "genuine"266 consent. Morally
significant consent must be informed and match the activities it
legitimates.267 One who is less than fully informed of the intentions
of another, even when she consents to those intentions that are
clear, consents nonetheless to other intentions to which she might
choose to dissent if she could only be aware of the full range of those
intentions. 268 When the possibility of dissent does not exist, neither
does significant consent. The coercion, though more subtle,
nevertheless treats its subject as a means by preventing a full range
of consent/dissent possibilities. 269
O'Neill argued that to treat others as persons, one "must view
them not abstractly as possibly consenting adults, but as particular
men and women with limited and determinate capacities to
understand or to consent to proposals for action."270  For O'Neill,
consent is obviously inauthentic in several circumstances. For
example, true consent may not exist "when there is ignorance,
duress, misrepresentation, pressure, or the like."271 This view is
reminiscent of Martha Chamallas's and William Eskridge's
260 Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
261 See Onora O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 252 (1985)
[hereinafter O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults]; Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253,
at 1397-98, 1426-30.
262 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 252.
263 Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253, at 1398.
264 See O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 253; Wright, Consenting
Adults, supra note 253, at 1414.
265 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 258-60.
266 Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253, at 1414.
267 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 254-57.
268 Id. at 256.
269 Id. at 259.
270 Id. at 253.
271 Id. at 254.
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discussion of mutuality and equality. 272
Wright added that noncoercive factors can also influence a
person's consent which "has social antecedents. '273 He explained:
We do not have pure personalities apart from the social
formation of our preferences, including our preferences to
consent or refuse to consent....
But not all processes of the social formation of preferences
are equal in the degree to which they respect freedom and
dignity. There is a real difference . . . between a broad
education and brainwashing.2 7 4
One might argue that the socialization to male sexual initiative,
masculine norms, and male hierarchical dominance that Abrams
noted,275 and to wife-like tasks that MacKinnon identified,276 are
examples of socialization processes that do not respect individual
freedom and dignity.
Commercial advertising provides another example of a
noncoercive influence on consent, beyond even the inclination to
consent to a purchase. Aspirational advertising specifically appeals
to people through images that portray them as they wish to be.
According to the popular on-line encyclopedia, Wikipedia, the
aspirational age in our culture is sixteen or seventeen.2 77
In theory, consumers younger than this age aspire to the
maturity and freedom it signifies, while those older than it
seek to recapture the (real or imagined) youthfulness and
freedom from responsibility of this age. Thus, products
pitched at notional 16-year-olds will appeal to a broader
target market.278
Marketers even developed an aspirational name for targeted
juvenile consumers between ages eight and twelve: "tweens."279 One
272 See supra notes 74, 79 and accompanying text.
273 Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253, at 1435.
274 Id.
275 See Abrams, supra note 14, at 1205-17.
276 See MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 44.
277 Wikipedia, Aspirational Age, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiAspirational-age (last visited
Dec. 19, 2006).
278 Id.
279 Kay S. Hymowitz, Girls' Sexy Aspirations Are Marketers' Target, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Oct. 7, 2000, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/-philinq-
girls sexy-aspiration.htm; Lynn Neary, Tweens and Media: What's Too Adult? (NPR radio




reporter commented that "a quick visit to the mall makes it clear
that marketers believe what girls . . . want to be is an 18-year-old
starlet on the make. Snakeskin pants, belly shirts, faux leopard
jackets and bikini underwear are this season's offerings for little
girls."280
While philosophical purists might argue that twenty-first century
American advertising has nothing to do with Kantian ethical
discourse, others will disagree.281 Arguably, philosophers, jurists,
and scientists need to understand the influences brought to bear on
American teens as these professional adults consider how the law
should assist (or not) sexually harassed adolescents. Conceivably,
the aspirational brainwashing that bathes our teens-through
magazines, on television, in music, on DVDs, in movies, and at the
mall-influences how they respond to sexual advances from adult
co-workers. Assuming this brainwashing occurs, and I see it when
trying to purchase clothing for my own teen, 282 then we need to
evaluate whether the commercial seduction of teens influences their
vulnerability to seduction in the more traditional sense. And should
the law account for this phenomenon?
O'Neill suggested, "A planned seduction of someone less
experienced treats him or her as means even when charmingly
done. Employers who take paternalistic interest in employees' lives
may yet both use them and fail to treat them as persons."28 3 In the
first instance, the seducer entices the seduced into a wrongful,
foolish, or unintended action. The seduced does not consent because
she does not have the experience to understand the action itself, its
probable consequences, or both. She does not know to what she
might be consenting.
In the second instance, the employer may believe that, for
example, contract concessions will benefit employees. Many
employees may still consent to a bad contract with concessions
because they have no alternative source of income. By failing to
280 Hymowitz, supra note 279.
281 See, e.g., Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253, at 1413 ('The imperatives of a
commercial society based on consumption tend to close our eyes to legal enforcement of
transactions based on insufficient knowledge and freedom.").
282 I call the "fashion statement" pervasive in the teen departments at most chain stores
the "Apr~s Molestation" look. We cannot avoid the torn jeans, thongs visible over pants cut
just above the pubic bone, T-shirts that fall off shoulders, and shoes that have teens tottering
as if they were still reeling from an attack. I have also heard the style called the "Come Fuck
Me" look. I find this appellation doubly offensive but apt because, in addition to its crudity, it
suggests, as some adults believe, that these girls invite their own sexual violation.
283 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 253.
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acknowledge the complete economic dependence of many employees
and their lack of options, the employer also fails to treat them as
persons as he uses them to make money. Both the seducer and the
employer fail to respect the involved persons and "their particular
capacities for rational and autonomous action. '28 4 Does sexual
harassment law, as applied by jurists, fail to respect the particular
capacities of workers? Anita Bernstein thought so.
Bernstein's sexual harassment legal theory draws on Kantian
ethics to propose a change in sexual harassment jurisprudence.
Bernstein noted that the sexual harassment prima facie case
requires that the plaintiff prove the conduct both subjectively
offensive at the time it occurred and objectively offensive. 28 5 She
disfavored the purportedly objective "reasonable person" standard
for a variety of reasons, including the historic treatment of women
as unreasonable or irrational.28 6 Instead, she advocated a standard
based on respect, or the recognition of a person's inherent worth as
a human being.28 7 She suggested that "the respectful person must
replace the reasonable person as the gauge by which courts
determine whether the alleged harasser has violated the law."28 8
Bernstein concluded, "Kantian ethics, widely (although not
universally) esteemed for their breadth and compelling clarity,
comport with the worldviews of many persons - indeed, many
religions and societies - and suggest a consensus upon which
lawmaking may build."28 9
C. Double Duty, Context, and the Person
While Bernstein focused on the duty not to disrespect, both
Wright and O'Neill highlighted that Kant's ethic calls for positive
action-beneficence-in addition to restraint from disrespect.290
284 Id. at 264.
285 Bernstein, supra note 14, at 452-53.
286 Id. at 456.
287 Id. at 452. Bernstein said:
As philosophers have elaborated, a fundamental meaning of respect, apart from a
separate meaning of esteem, is recognition of a person's inherent worth. Respect in the
sense of recognition is owed to all persons, and thus workplace sexual harassment
betrays the ideal of recognition respect, regardless of whether the harassed worker
deserves high esteem.
Id.; see also Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 298-99 (discussing Bernstein's
inherent worth standard).
288 Bernstein, supra note 14, at 525.
289 Id. at 483 (footnotes omitted).
290 Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 277-79.
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The notion that one should not use another merely as a means to an
end reflects the need for respect.291 Kant also believed that one
should treat persons as ends in themselves. 292 O'Neill explained,
"Policies of practical love or beneficence require us to recognize the
needs particular others have for assistance in acting on their
maxims and achieving their ends."293 For illustration, return to the
example of the employer. The employer need not have as an end
goal the employee's economic survival; however, the employer must
acknowledge the employee's survival as his or her end goal and,
therefore, recognize his or her limited bargaining position at the
contract negotiation table.
O'Neill elaborated on the idea of treating others as ends:
[T]he Kantian conception of beneficence is from the start
antipaternalistic. The duty to seek others' happiness is
always a duty to promote and share others' ends without
taking them over, rather than a duty to provide determinate
goods and services or to meet others' needs, or to see that
their ends are achieved. Beneficence of this sort presupposes
others who are at least partly autonomous and have their
own ends.
294
This discussion of ethical conduct sheds light in two arenas: the
adult's duty at work and our duty as legal theorists interested in
fostering adolescent workers. Adolescents are at least partly
autonomous, rational persons at work. The adult harasser is
perhaps the seducer who beguiles adolescent "consent" to sexual
activity with charm and by leveraging power, authority, and
perhaps more to gain sexual favors. In this case, the harasser fails
to treat the adolescent as a person because he fails to consider or,
even worse, knowingly takes advantage of her inexperience and
"particular capacities for rational and autonomous action,"295
including the developing psychosocial traits that Cauffman and
Steinberg noted. 296  His conduct expresses his attitude toward
humanity: disrespect.
291 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 265.
292 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 262; Wright, Treating Persons,
supra note 247, at 278 & n.35.
293 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 265; see also Wright, Treating
Persons, supra note 247, at 282 (discussing Kant's theory of "need-fulfillment").
294 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 265; see also Wright, Treating
Persons, supra note 247, at 279-81 (discussing Kant's theory of benevolence).
295 O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 264.
296 See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 202, at 1764-65.
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Confused, one might argue that any teen who "consents"
manifests her end. That might be true; however, whether it is or is
not has as much to do with the context and activity as with the
teen's particular capabilities. For example, if an adult asks to
borrow the teen's cellular phone and the teen consents, is the teen
used as a mere means to an end? Probably not. But what if the
adult then uses the phone, not just to place a call, but to download
expensive digital images off the Internet? Arguably, that use goes
beyond the consent given and is inconsistent with the teen's goal of
helping a friend make a telephone call. In that case, the adult has
used the teen-via her cell phone-as merely a means to an end
because he could not have gotten consent for conduct that she did
not anticipate.
Similarly, if an adult entices "consent" to sex, the adult's end may
not be congruent with the "consent" and the teen's end. For
example, the adult may want only sexual gratification. The
adolescent may desire intimacy or status. She might seek a sense of
importance and worth, or maturity, or being cared for as an adult-
none of which may actually occur. 297 Those ends are not necessarily
compatible with raw sexual gratification.
While Kant emphasized universal maxims, as the above examples
demonstrate, the type of activity and context may figure
importantly in an evaluation of ethical conduct. O'Neill focused on
sexual relationships to explain this point. She said that sexual
intimacy, commonly understood, conveys affection, openness, trust,
and "a commitment which goes beyond a momentary clinging. 298
When "gestures of intimacy are not used to convey what they
standardly convey, miscommunication is peculiarly likely."299
O'Neill discussed two important results from intimate conduct:
First, those who are intimate acquire deep and detailed (but
incomplete) knowledge of one another's life, character, and
desires. Secondly, each forms some desires which
incorporate or refer to the other's desires, and consequently
finds his or her happiness in some ways contingent upon the
fulfillment of the other's desires. Intimacy is not a merely
cognitive relationship, but one where special possibilities for
respecting and sharing (alternatively for disrespecting and
297 See Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 18, at 41-42 ("[Mlore than a quarter of
sexually active teens... [sought] a more intimate relationship through sexual intercourse.").




frustrating) another's ends and desires develop. It is in
intimate relationships that we are most able to treat others
as persons-and most able to fail to do so.300
If one considers this reasoning in the context of an adult's sexual
advances toward a teen at work, one can see how the teen might
misconstrue the communication. The teen might see affection and
commitment where the adult desires only sexual intercourse or
other sexual gratification. Assume that O'Neill is correct and
intimacy is not merely a cognitive relationship.
Then, adolescents, who demonstrate less temperance, perspective,
responsibility, and are generally less sexually experienced, are even
less likely than adults to recognize manipulative or exploitative
gestures. They may "consent," having formed a desire that
incorporates the other's desire for sexual gratification.
Robin West anticipated a similar response from adult women
when she contemplated a liberal, gender-neutral perspective
regarding consent and sexual engagement. She wrote:
[I]f women "consent" to transactions not to increase our own
welfare, but to increase the welfare of others-if women are
"different" in this psychological way-then the liberal's ethic
of consent, with its presumption of an essentially selfish
human (male) actor and an essentially selfish consensual act,
when even-handedly applied to both genders, will have
disastrous implications for women. 30 1
If women do think differently than men, and if teens, because of
their "developing capacities," think differently than adults, then
teen females may need adults to anticipate their particular
adolescent capabilities, especially when addressing teen sexual
harassment.
D. The "Formula of the End" and Sexual Harassment Law
The categorical imperative and the mandate to treat rational
beings as persons offer guidance to legal theorists addressing the
issue of teen harassment. They dictate against the paternalistic
denial of teen capacity and the substitution of socially approved
ends concerning juvenile workers, for a particular teen's ends. 30 2
300 Id. at 270 (footnotes omitted).
301 Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 92 (1987).
302 See generally O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, supra note 261, at 271-72 (comparing
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The categorical imperative, as applied in the context of teen sexual
harassment, requires that we treat teens as persons and not merely
as a means to our end-the eradication of workplace sexual
harassment. To treat them with respect, we must acknowledge
their cognitive abilities, sexuality, partial autonomy, and
"developing capacity." To treat them with beneficence and as
persons, we also take into account their relative lack of power,
responsibility, perspective, and temperance. Onora O'Neill said,
"Among vulnerable beings agency can be secure for all only when
agents act to support as well as to respect one another's agency."30 3
We need to support the agency of our developing youth.
The question remains how best to support adolescent agency and
protect them with the law. Wright concluded that sometimes
"dignity can be upheld best, if not only, by means other than
enforced compliance with legal or majoritarian norms .... Persons
can, in typical cases of injury to their own dignity, often be led to
revoke their consent . . . through noncoercive means."304  No
problem. In my experience, teens resist enforced compliance with
adult majoritarian norms anyway. How can we get them to see
when their "consent" was misguided though? How can we foster
revocation without becoming paternalistic? We will certainly deter
adolescent revocation of "consent" to illegal or ill-advised workplace
sexual conduct if we penalize them under sexual harassment laws
for their initial "consent."
Kant, Rousseau, and many others have suggested that education
is the key to moral development and growth. 30 5 Wright explained,
"Education is closely linked to rational development, the exercise of
autonomy, and the fullest expression of human dignity. Treating all
persons as ends in themselves requires the provision of educational
opportunities, at public expense if necessary. . . . Kant regards
the failures of paternalism with other relationships).
303 ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 140 (1989).
304 Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253, at 1434-35.
305 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION ch. 3 (1966) (describing the
importance of education as providing an individual direction); IMMANUEL KANT, EDUCATION
ch. I (Annette Churton, trans. 1966) (1960) (discussing the physical education of children); 1
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE
IDEA OF JUSTICE 1, 4 (1981) (outlining a basic theory on the stages of educational
development); JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 353 (Marjorie Gabain
trans., 1965) (discussing moral education according to Durkheim); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 101 (1971) ("[Ilmportant is the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the




education as of central importance." 306 Thus, education may help in
the case of teen sexual harassment.
Some adults have already identified the education answer and its
potential in the battle against teen sexual harassment. In 2004, the
EEOC launched its website and educational campaign. 30 7 In an
unpublished Consent Decree, Judge Sarah Evans Barker of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
ordered Taco Bell to adopt and implement a special training
program. 308 She ruled that "[t]his training shall cover unlawful
employment practices under Title VII ... with particular emphasis
on the awareness of discrimination issues that may affect youth,
and especially minors, at work."30 9 I would add that we also need to
educate by example. Adults must model appropriate workplace
conduct for new adolescent workers.
Will education cure the problem? No, not completely. As
Cauffman and Steinberg noted, increasing knowledge may not
always lead to better decision-making. For example, they warned
that "while adolescents are largely aware of the relationships
between condom use and the probability of HIV infection, two-thirds
of sexually active sixteen to nineteen year olds surveyed in a recent
study reported engaging in sexual intercourse without using a
condom."310 Thus, the law needs to anticipate that until adolescents
have sufficient experience and maturity, some will "consent" to sex
solicited by an adult co-worker.
One way to satisfy the categorical imperative in the case of teen
harassment is, as previously discussed, to permit teens to void their
"consent" to sex with an adult co-worker or supervisor, without legal
penalty during their minority, if they conclude that the adult has
treated them merely a means to an end. If jurists invalidate
''consent" at the liability phase and admit evidence of "consent" at
the damages phase of any trial, they treat "consent" inconsistently
and use teens merely as a means to their end of eradicating sexual
harassment. 311 They also give "consent" more value than it is
306 Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 318.
307 See EEOC, Youth @ Work, http://youth.eeoc.gov/index.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006);
Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Reaches Out to High Schoolers to Combat Workplace
Harassment of Teens (Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-15-04.html.
308 See EEOC v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 1:05-cv-0998-SEB-TAB, Consent Decree (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 16, 2006) (on file with author).
309 Jennifer A. Drobac, 'Please Don't; I Have My Standards!, 27 BNA EMP. DISCRIMINATION
REP., July 12, 2006, at 55, 57.
310 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 202, at 1772.
31, See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 714 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[A]lthough consent to
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worth. Wright suggested:
The crucial point remains that the proper scope or value of
consent-even free and knowledgeable consent-depends on
other considerations and finally on an ultimate value, human
dignity. An act of consent or refusal to consent that
genuinely and substantially undermines human dignity, in
the person of the chooser or others, is on shaky grounds at
best, however much that choice may promote utility. 312
The notion of allowing even adults to withdraw consent is not a
new one. For example, consumers often have the right to rescind
agreements made with door-to-door salespersons within three days
without penalty or obligation. 313 Wright explained that "[i]n the
door-to-door sales case, the salesperson may use manipulative or
high-pressure sales techniques that create a merely temporary
desire for the product. The cooling-off period gives the buyer time to
reflect on whether the perceived need is authentic."314
Arguably, this reasoning applies to adolescents who might
succumb to manipulative or high pressure requests for sexual favors
that create merely a temporary desire to experience sex. The
rescission period, extended through minority, to account for
"developing capacity" gives the adolescent time to reflect on whether
the relationship was equal and mutual.
One might argue that consumers do not typically proceed to sue
the employers of high pressure salespersons after withdrawal of
consent and rescission of the agreement; however, consumers do not
need to do so. Consumers can return to their pre-bargain position
typically by providing written notice of rescission. Youth who
"consent" typically cannot return to their "pre-consent" position;
therefore, they should be allowed to sue for the value of what was
lost in the corrupt transaction or their damages.
Wright concluded that "there is no deep Kantian reason why the
sexual relations with a coworker . . . is not a defense in a . . . suit for sexual harassment
brought by a plaintiff who was underage when the conduct alleged to constitute harassment
occurred, this does not mean that the conduct of the plaintiff can never be used to reduce the
defendant's damages in such a case.").
312 Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 253, at 1425.
313 Id. at 1413. Wright also gave the example of a consumer credit transaction in which
the creditor acquires a security interest in the consumer's home. The consumer also has the
right rescind that contract within three days. This right reduces the chance that a consumer
might lose "one of his most precious possessions"' after making an ill-considered deal. Id. at
1413-14 (quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210,
1216 (2d. Cir. 1973)) (footnotes omitted).
314 Id. at 1414.
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Kantian duty of respect should not be legally enforced even in cases
in which the target did not, for some reason, perceive her situation
to be one of harassment. '31 5 When she does perceive conduct as
harassment within a reasonable period thereafter, the law should
respect her and protect her dignity.
VI. CONCLUSION
"But to stand an' be still to the Birken'ead Drill
is a damn tough bullet to chew" 316
Rudyard Kipling, Soldier an' Sailor Too
The Birkenhead Drill-a damn tough bullet to chew? Our
teenagers need comprehensive legal protections against sexual
harassment and abuse at work. As demonstrated in this Article,
they are at particular risk for several reasons. First, adolescents
have never been legal or political equals to adults. Both the law and
our political processes evidence their subservient status. We
exercise dominion over them, often to care for them, by teaching
them to comply with and respect adult authority. Their
subordinated status makes some teens vulnerable to sexual
harassment by adults.
Second, teens have not finished maturing in a variety of ways just
identified; however, they may look physically mature, causing
people to expect them to behave as adults would. Third, adolescents
are inexperienced and often have not completed their educational
training. They may not recognize harassing or manipulative
conduct to protest or resist it. Fourth, teens are sexual beings. If
we ignore that fact, we fail to anticipate their needs, including their
need for protection from sexual predators. Fifth, teens may work
for academic credit in addition to economic rewards; therefore,
predatory supervisors possess an additional tool, not available for
use against most adults, for leveraging sexual favors. Finally, both
boys and girls experience sexual harassment on the job. Thus, a
subordination theory that serves only women fails to address the
harassment of male teens.
We must stand fast while we formulate a theoretical and ethical
framework to customize for adolescent workers the legal prohibition
of sexual harassment by adults. A life boat, a sturdy theoretical
315 Wright, Treating Persons, supra note 247, at 299.
316 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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foundation, can be crafted to support such prohibitions and to
protect our youth. The framework should include elements of
subordination theory that accurately account for the intersectional,
sexist, and gendered nature of the sexual harassment of teens. The
subordinated group members are predominantly young and female
(or effeminate, or femalized in some manner) and our theoretical
framework should address this fact. 317
We should, however, build a theoretical framework that works for
all young individuals-who may not be capable of responding to
sexual harassment or resisting solicitations the way adults might.
The categorical imperative, or a dignity-based theory, serves to
justify protections designed for teen workers. It acknowledges
adolescent autonomy, their particular capacities, and their potential
for growth and development.
This Article proposes making "consent" voidable and allowing
teens to sue under Title VII. Evidence of any prior "consent" should
be inadmissible at both the liability and damage phases of trial. We
should not discourage complaints by penalizing those workers who
are "developing capacity." Making "consent" voidable is but one
practical approach built upon this theoretical foundation for the
prohibition of teen sexual harassment. With this Article, I send an
S.O.S. for assistance to feminists, legal theorists and philosophers,
parents, employers, and even to all working teens. We stand
together in this drill or we risk losing our children to the sexual
pirates and other harassers of the American workplace.
317 Perhaps all children are femalized in our regard since they come so recently from
women.
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